The Apprehension of Gleams of Infinite Light: The Upright Religion and Sectarianism

Jungle forest with Tree root and sun flare - vintage filter

This article was originally published in Spektrum Iran (3 – 2011), and is republished here with permission of the author.

There is only but one single truth. God, who is al-Ḥaqq, is at once the only Truth and the only Reality; there being none other. This divine unicity and cognitive unity calls forth in man a single-minded and wholehearted attachment to the Truth as such. This is as it should be. But God in His infinite perfections is essentially unfathomable. Being separated from Him, we can only know Him through His names, signs, and creations, which are apparently not “one” but rather multiple and multifarious. The multiplicity of the created order makes the single-minded attachment to the One Truth a difficult and somewhat perilous endeavor. To the degree that we become attached to any one particular sign or manifestation and lose sight of its essential identity with the Essence, and hence with all other manifestations, we are not giving God His due and are in reality trying to limit the non-delimited Totality. This truth applies to all things that are primarily connected with the divine and constitute the ways and means by which He is approached. Hence religion, when it is humanized and seen as an ideology that is on par with and in opposition to other religions, acts as an obstacle and barrier to the wholehearted worship of God immaculate—a worship that would constitute what the Qurʾan calls the “upright religion” that was brought by all prophets. [1]In many of his speeches, Imam Khumaynī (r) reminded his audience that if all of the prophets were to be gathered in one place and at one time, they would not have any conflict or discord with one another. See: http://www.hawzah.net/Hawzah/magazines/MagArt.aspx?MagazineNumberID=4334&id=28408

The sign which tells us that our hearts are no longer open to the infinite nature of the divine and which warns us that veils have entrapped them is complacency. When we are complacent and comfortable with our religion, being smug with the “fact” that we and only we are in possession of the “whole” truth, that is when the true worship of God ceases and the raison d’être of religion is no longer in place. Such complacency brings about a false sense of euphoria and happiness. The Qurʾan speaks of this happiness as a quality possessed by the mushrikūn in the following verses:

فَأَقِمْ وَجْهَكَ لِلدِّينِ حَنِيفًا ۚ فِطْرَتَ اللَّـهِ الَّتِي فَطَرَ النَّاسَ عَلَيْهَا ۚ لَا تَبْدِيلَ لِخَلْقِ اللَّـهِ ۚ ذَٰلِكَ الدِّينُ الْقَيِّمُ وَلَـٰكِنَّ أَكْثَرَ النَّاسِ لَا يَعْلَمُونَ ﴿٣٠﴾ مُنِيبِينَ إِلَيْهِ وَاتَّقُوهُ وَأَقِيمُوا الصَّلَاةَ وَلَا تَكُونُوا مِنَ الْمُشْرِكِينَ ﴿٣١﴾ مِنَ الَّذِينَ فَرَّقُوا دِينَهُمْ وَكَانُوا شِيَعًا ۖ كُلُّ حِزْبٍ بِمَا لَدَيْهِمْ فَرِحُونَ﴿٣٢﴾

So set your heart on the religion as a people of pure faith, the origination of Allah according to which He originated mankind (There is no altering Allah’s creation; that is the upright religion, but most people do not know)—turning to Him in penitence, and be wary of Him, and maintain the prayer, and do not be among the polytheists—of those who split up their religion and became sects: each faction exulting in what it possessed.[2]Qurʾan, al-Rūm (30):30-32.

Sulṭān Muḥammad Gunābādī, a mystic of the 19th century, comments on this verse in his exegesis of the Qurʾan:

Know that on account of his human nature, man is predisposed to attachment and association. If he were to become aware, he would know that he has not achieved human perfections per se, and that which he has achieved is not his complete perfection; rather, there exist for him boundless “lost” perfections [of which he is presently deprived]. So, if he is in search of that which he has lost—the seeker being none other than the wayfarer journeying to God in all sincerity—then he will not be happy with that which is [presently] with himself, but rather, he will abhor it and will turn away from it. But he who is not in search of that which he has lost will become attached to nothing but that which he has achieved of superficial perfections such as sciences, beliefs, qualities, moral virtues, mystical disclosures, wealth, and children. It is in this way that “every faction exults in that which it possesses”; the street-sweeper exults in the perfection of his sweeping, the magician of his magic, the businessman of his business, the scholar of his knowledge, the worshiper of his worship, the ascetic of his asceticism, and the mystic of his mysticism.[3]Sulṭān Muḥammad Gunābādī, Tafsīr Bayān al-Saʿādah fī Maqāmāt al-ʿIbādah, vol. 3 (Beirut, 1988), p. 221.

Now this should not be taken to mean that the “superficial perfections” are not perfections, or that which a person has achieved and acquired of the truth is not the truth, so as to imply either the relativity of knowledge or the relativity of truth, and bring about a debilitating skepticism cum pluralism. Rather, what this quote is emphasizing is the limitation of knowledge that comes with the human state, and the truth that awareness of this limitation is quintessential to the spiritual life of the individual soul as well as the religion as a whole. For it is only when man comes to know that he does not know, that he acquires the necessary humility to turn to God in penitence.

The awareness of his ignorance with respect to reality and the Real allows him to be truly wary of God (ittaqūhu) and consequently to continuously aspire to maintain His remembrance by maintaining the prayer.

For it is only when man comes to know that he does not know, that he acquires the necessary humility to turn to God in penitence.

On the contrary, when man is oblivious to the limitations of his knowledge and claims to possess it in an absolute and exclusive sense—this is when he is making the relative to be the absolute and the limited to be the unlimited, and this is nothing other than shirk.

وَمَا يُؤْمِنُ أَكْثَرُهُم بِاللَّـهِ إِلَّا وَهُم مُّشْرِكُونَ

And most of them do not believe in Allah without doing shirk.[4]Qurʾan, Yūsuf (12):106.

When this is done in the case of religion, which is the way to God, it leads to sectarianism. In sectarianism, the madhāhib are absolutized to the extent that there remains no room for any other manifestation of God’s infinite Truth.

This does not mean that man cannot know and must remain oblivious of the possibility of deviation in any religion and the coming to the scene of heterodoxies and heresies—for error does exist and it can be recognized. Hence any error posing as a religion or a madhhab must be exposed. When any sect moves away from the guiding principles of the religion in which it is based, it becomes a heterodoxy and eventually a heresy. In the case of Islam, the essential and substantial principles of the Truth are succinctly expressed in the shahādatayn. Imam Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq (ʿa) defines the Muḥammadan Islam and its canonical consequences in the following manner:

الاسلام شهادة أن لا إله إلّا الله والتصديق برسول الله (ص) به حُقِنَت الدِّمَاءُ وعليه جرتْ المَناكِحُ والمَواريثُ وعلى ظاهره جماعةُ الناس

Islam is the testimony ‘there is no god but Allah’ and the affirmation of the Messenger of Allah (); because of it blood is spared, upon it marriages and inheritances take place; and on its apparentness the congregation of people [as an Ummah] transpires.[5]al-Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, vol. 2, p. 25.

This “simple” criterion of the shahādatayn is in fact extremely profound and full of wisdom. On the one hand, it reflects the breadth and horizontal scope that God wishes Islam to have, whereby anyone who even verbally consents to these truths is included in the fold of God’s infinite mercy and generosity. Allowing for this is to say that the limited understanding of any believer, no matter how weak, is still a truth and an instance of an understanding that is valid. For though it might be weak and low, because it is pointing to something higher and hence “open-ended”—and while it is not in conflict with the basic principles—it is an authentic representation of the truth and is spiritually efficacious.

On the other hand, the criterion of the shahādatayn reflects the great depth and the vertical infinitude of the truth of Islam and God. It is because tawḥīd, or God’s unicity, ultimately pertains to His Essence, which de facto cannot be fathomed, and because the inner substance of the Messenger of Allah () is beyond the reach of lesser men, that the shahādatayn remind us of Divine Mystery and our limitations with regard to it. To rephrase, speculatively (theoria) the Divine Essence is unknowable and Its infinite words or signs are inexhaustible, and practically (praxis) the prophetic substance is superabundant and the sunnah of the Prophet () cannot be practiced by imperfect men in its totality.

…speculatively (theoria) the Divine Essence is unknowable and Its infinite words or signs are inexhaustible, and practically (praxis) the prophetic substance is superabundant and the sunnah of the Prophet (ṣ) cannot be practiced by imperfect men in its totality.

To repeat, on the one hand, the limited truth is true in reality (it is not a construct and creation of the human mind as asserted by skeptics, relativists, and pluralists), and this leads to certainty on the cognitive plane and resolve on the volitional level. With regards to the madhhab that any believer might be following, it brings about a surety and determination that is characteristic of those that worship God. On the other hand, the limited truth is limited due to man’s limitation of knowledge, and upon introspection, he knows that he does not know the total Truth, and this leads to a sacred perplexity (taḥayyur) on the noetic plane and to humility on the plane of the will. Such an awareness ensures that the follower of a madhhab does not absolutize it and take it to be the Truth. But if he were to put humility aside and feign to own the “truth”, then the ingrained sectarianism that would ensue would initially set him at odds with other sects, but eventually it would put him in conflict with other followers of his own sect, as he would see their version or reading of the sect to be “wrong” precisely because it is against his own understanding and the one that he “possesses”.

The allure of this spirit of “possessing” the truth is so great that it is ubiquitously found in all religious movements—especially those that claim to be the defenders of the true doctrine. Such claims are more predominant among the ideologues, activists, and the politicians, as their predilection for the pole of action over contemplation, or for the level of the rational over the properly intellectual does not give them the necessary depth of understanding to have an awareness of the truth that is not in their possession (ladayhim) and that is principially with God (ʿind Allah). The recent claims of a government official in Iran, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, to the ascendancy of the “school of Iran” over the “school of Islam”, can be understood in this light, as can the outrageous statements of the Kuwaiti-born demagogue, Yāsir al-Ḥabīb, on one side, as well as the diatribe of Wahhabi pulpiteers, on the other.

On a positive note, there are in the ummah more balanced voices of greater intellectuality. The most recent of these is the historic fatwa of the Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Āyatullāh al-ʿUẓmā al-Sayyid ʿAlī Khamenei, in which he decreed:

[Even] the deprecation of the notables of our Sunni brothers is forbidden (ḥarām), to say nothing of the denunciation of the wife of the Prophet (the blessings of Allah upon him and his progeny) so as to violate her honor—this is rather not even possible in respect of the wives of the prophets [in general] and especially in the case of their master, the Greatest Messenger (the blessings of Allah upon him and his progeny).[6]یحرم النیل من رموز إخواننا السنة فضلاً عن اتهام زوج النبي (صلّى الله عليه وآله) بما يخل بشرفها بل هذا الأمر ممتنع على نساء الأنبياء وخصوصاً سيدهم الرسول الأعظم (صلّى الله عليه وآله).

Now, those sectarians who are sincere in their defense of their limited version of truth bring forth from traditional sources proofs for their perspective. On one level, it is easy to respond to them by saying that they are only seeing one side of the story and are not giving due attention to other traditions which oppose and may even abrogate their own proofs. But this, though perhaps sufficient for some, would be a superficial response. For while it is true that such individuals are guilty of absolutizing the limited truth that is in their possession, the very existence of such traditions which allow them to do so is a matter that is open to questioning. Why do there exist narrations and traditions in the Shiʿi corpus that would be found offensive to Sunnis and vice versa? Is it the case that these traditions have simply been fabricated? Do they, as the sectarians would have us believe, allude to the fact that the other side is totally wrong and that there is only one sect that will be saved, all the others deserving only hellfire? Or can there be another explanation for these polemical traditions?

The Dome of the Rock (مسجد قبة الصخرة‎), on the Temple Mount in the Old City of Jerusalem.

One possible explanation comes from the mystics of Islam. In their discussions on the beautiful names of Allah, they talk of two different realities which they refer to with the expressions, “the marriage of the names” and the “opposition of the names”.[7]تناكح بين السماء والتقابل الذي في الأسماء The latter phrase outlines the necessity of the opposition of certain names with others on the plane of manifestation. They stress the fact that this opposition here only highlights the greatness of the unity that prevails on the higher planes. To them the qualitative plenitude of God’s unicity directly implies His rich multiplicity, along with its apparent conflicts and differences.

It is in this light that there can be “necessary antagonisms” among the madhāhib; for in its attempt to fully manifest its idea and “name”, each madhhab seeks to forge an identity that is “separate” from the others.

…for in its attempt to fully manifest its idea and “name”, each madhhab seeks to forge an identity that is “separate” from the others.

The polemics that follow serve to maintain its integrity and allow for the madhhab to display its particular genius. Hence the existence of certain divisive traditions—usually based on historical details and facts—is perhaps the madhhab’s way of keeping the lowest of their adherents within the fold.

However, what kept these traditions from feeding the flames of rampant sectarianism in the past was the existence of higher levels of intellectuality and a living spirituality as embodied in the ʿulamāʾ and the saints of Islam. These accomplished souls made sure that the madhhab was firmly grounded in the doctrines and principles of Islam formally speaking, that it was in continuous communion with the Prophetic presence on the substantial level, and that it was open to spiritual wayfaring on the essential plane. Of course, those who could reach this last stage were few indeed, but it was they who used the full capacity of their intellect to see the unity that lies beyond the opposition and antagonism in the manifested order, and it is they who would then (re)turn to the people to enjoin them to work towards unity.

تَحْسَبُهُمْ جَمِيعًا وَقُلُوبُهُمْ شَتَّىٰ

You suppose them to be a united body, but their hearts are disunited. That is because they are a lot who do not intellect.[8]Qurʾan, al-Ḥashr (59):14.

Unity is based upon the coming together of the hearts; disunity is their being dispersed. Disunity is a sign of an absence of true intellectuality. Imam ʿAlī (ʿa), who was the very embodiment of principled intellectuality after the Prophet (), wholeheartedly practiced the Qurʾanic imperative of unity and avoided creating disunity at all costs. Āyatullāh Jawādī Āmulī writes:

Ḥaḍrat Amīr al-Muʾminīn (ʿa) was foremost in not being tainted by any type of sectarianism nor sullied by any kind of internecine discord; his way was always in line with universal agreement [and general consent].[9]Jawādī Āmulī, The Expectation of Mankind from Religion, p. 127.

Hence, in a letter to Abū Mūsā al-Ashʿarī, Imam ʿAlī (ʿa) wrote:

وليس رَجُلٌ فاعلم أحرص على جماعةِ أمّةِ محمدٍ (ص) وأُلفَتِها مِنّي أبتَغِي بذلك حُسْنَ الثوابِ وكَرَمَ المآبِ

There is not a man—heed this—more anxious to preserve the integrity and union of the ummah of Muḥammad () than I. I seek for this [nothing but] a goodly reward and a noble end [with Allah].[10]Nahj al-Balāgah, sermon 78.

The Imam warned of the dangers of disunity in this way:

فَإياكم والتَّلَوُّنَ في دين اللهِ فإنَّ جماعةً فيما تَكرَهونَ من الحقِّ خيرٌ من فُرقَةٍ فيما تُحِبُّونَ من الباطلِ وإِنَّ اللهَ سبحانَه لم يُعْطِ أحداً بِفُرقَةٍ خيراً مِمَّنْ مضى ولا مِمَّن بَقِي

Beware of subjecting God’s religion to vagaries [and whims]. Indeed unity for the truth, though disliked by you, is better than divisiveness for a falsehood that you like; and indeed Allah, glory be to Him, has given no good to anyone on account of division and disunity—neither in the past nor in the future.[11]Nahj al-Balāgah, sermon 176.

Hence, when we give our own “color” (talawwun) to religion and limit it by forcing it to confine to the limits of our human imperfections and nafsānī predilections, we open the way to a false happiness or smugness with regards to the product of our caprice. We label this created sect and contrived faction with the word “religion”, not realizing that in doing so we effectively put an end to the true nature of religion and stifle its ability to act as an open-ended vehicle of transformation (an upaya, as the “upper” end of religion must necessarily involve the unlimited, infinite, and mysterious). This caricature of religion, being thus delimited and cut off vertically from its infinite source, the Real, is also cut off horizontally from other such caricatures, leading to contrariety and opposition with them.

Such division and divisiveness is liked by the lower soul as it is “happy” with its “own” creation and wishes for it to supersede all others.

فَتَقَطَّعُوا أَمْرَهُم بَيْنَهُمْ زُبُرًا ۖ كُلُّ حِزْبٍ بِمَا لَدَيْهِمْ فَرِحُونَ

But they fragmented their religion among themselves, each party exulting in what it had.[12]Qurʾan, al-Muʾminūn (23):53.

If on the other hand, we do not color the religion of Allah with our own hands, and we take what has come to us of the truth from Him—knowing it to be both the truth and limited—and use it to transcend ourselves by going beyond the lower caprice of our souls, though difficult and disliked by them, we will be able to see the limited truth in other divine dispensations and in other religious people. This subtle and sublime vision might enable us to unite with them for the sake of the higher Truth and His wish to be known in His infinite plenitude; but failing that, it must at the very least make us refrain from indulging in sectarianism that is the kiss of death of spirituality as such.

Notes   [ + ]

1. In many of his speeches, Imam Khumaynī (r) reminded his audience that if all of the prophets were to be gathered in one place and at one time, they would not have any conflict or discord with one another. See: http://www.hawzah.net/Hawzah/magazines/MagArt.aspx?MagazineNumberID=4334&id=28408
2. Qurʾan, al-Rūm (30):30-32.
3. Sulṭān Muḥammad Gunābādī, Tafsīr Bayān al-Saʿādah fī Maqāmāt al-ʿIbādah, vol. 3 (Beirut, 1988), p. 221.
4. Qurʾan, Yūsuf (12):106.
5. al-Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, vol. 2, p. 25.
6. یحرم النیل من رموز إخواننا السنة فضلاً عن اتهام زوج النبي (صلّى الله عليه وآله) بما يخل بشرفها بل هذا الأمر ممتنع على نساء الأنبياء وخصوصاً سيدهم الرسول الأعظم (صلّى الله عليه وآله).
7. تناكح بين السماء والتقابل الذي في الأسماء
8. Qurʾan, al-Ḥashr (59):14.
9. Jawādī Āmulī, The Expectation of Mankind from Religion, p. 127.
10. Nahj al-Balāgah, sermon 78.
11. Nahj al-Balāgah, sermon 176.
12. Qurʾan, al-Muʾminūn (23):53.

Intellection in the Islamic Tradition: A Lecture by Shahīd Muṭahharī

The following is the transcript of a lecture series by Shahīd Murtaẓā Muṭahharī to the Islamic Association of Doctors in Iran, delivered in the years 1973-1974. The series was later published, then translated by Dr. Mansoor Limba under the title Training and Education in Islam (Ahlul Bayt University, 2011), and can be purchased here. The translation has been slightly edited for clarity and readability.


 

Intellection (Taʿaqqul) in the Qurʾan

Islam strongly advocates intellection (taʿaqqul). I shall cite a Qurʾanic verse and a tradition which mentions this verse. We read in Surat al-Zumar:

فَبَشِّرْ عِبَادِ ٱلَّذِينَ يَسْتَمِعُونَ ٱلْقَوْلَ فَيَتَّبِعُونَ أَحْسَنَهُۥٓ ۚ أُو۟لَٰٓئِكَ ٱلَّذِينَ هَدَىٰهُمُ ٱللَّهُ ۖ وَأُو۟لَٰٓئِكَ هُمْ أُو۟لُوا۟ ٱلْأَلْبَٰبِ

“So give good news to My servants who listen to what is said and follow the best of it. They are the ones whom Allah has guided, and it is they who possess albāb.”[1]Qurʾan, al-Zumar (39):17-18.

The subject begins with “My servants.” It is as if the Qurʾan wants to say that to be Allah’s servant, one must have a certain description and this description would be a requisite for being His servant—that such a servant “listens to what is said.” Samāʿ (to hear) is different from istimaʿ (to listen). Samaʿ means to hear something whether you intended to listen or not. Istimāʿ means to hear but with attention. For example, you take a seat here [in this lecture hall] and prepare yourself for listening [to a lecturer]. Regarding [ḥarām] music, it is said that hearing it is not harām; what is harām is listening to it. The Qurʾan in this verse is describing those who listen to what is said. It means they do not reject any word which they have not yet discerned, and they do not say that they do not want to listen to it. They listen first and then make an assessment and an analysis afterward. They evaluate good and bad, and choose and follow the best of what they have heard. In essence, the verse highlights the independence of the intellect or reason (ʿaql) which must serve as a filter for humankind. He must filter all that he hears, meticulously assessing what is good and bad, and choosing and following the best of it.

The verse continues: “They are the ones whom Allah has guided.” Although this guidance is a rational one, the Qurʾan regards it as divine guidance. They are the ones who truly possess intellect (ulu al-albāb). Albāb is the plural form of the word lubb, which means kernel, not only in the sense of a “mind” but is used in a general sense, and is often used to describe fruits or foods. For example, we speak of a “walnut’s kernel.” Perhaps this is one of those expressions used exclusively by the Qurʾan (as we have not encountered this usage in other texts). Even if it were not the case, we can say that the Qurʾan uses the word “kernel” in many instances in describing the intellect. It is as if the Qurʾan likens man to a walnut or an almond which is entirely covered, but his essential part is his kernel which is located within. If you consider the entire human body and its limbs, his kernel is his intellect or reason. What shall we call an almond without a kernel? We say that it is empty or hollow, and it is thrown away. A person who lacks intellect does not possess the kernel and criterion of humanity; he is a hollow person. He is human in form but not in content. As such, intelligence sums up the meaning of “humanity” to that extent; to be intelligent bespeaks of his independence—“who listen to what is said and follow the best of it.” Basically, one cannot find an expression better than this call for man to support his independence: he must have the power to assess and evaluate. He must be able to analyze issues. A person who does not possess this talent is lacking something essential.

Basically, one cannot find an expression better than this call for man to support his independence: he must have the power to assess and evaluate.

Taʿaqqul in the Sunnah

In the sunnah,[2]Editor’s note: The Arabic word sunnah can be generally translated as “tradition” or “norm.” In the parlance of Shiʿi Islam it refers to the speech and actions of the Prophet Mohammad and the Imams (). especially in Shiʿi narrations, the intellect or intellection has been given much importance. One of the merits of Shiʿi narrations compared to non-Shiʿi narrations is the greater importance and authority given to the intellect. For this reason, social writers today including Sunnis acknowledge that in the Islamic period, Shiʿi reasoning has been stronger than its Sunni counterpart.

Aḥmad Amīn has a famous quadrilogy entitled Fajr al-Islām, Ḍuhā al-Islām, Ẓuhr al-Islām, and Yawm al-Islām. Fajr al-Islām is a single volume treatise. Ḍuhā al-Islām has three volumes. Ẓuhr al-Islām has four volumes. Yawm al-Islām is a one volume book. All-in-all, the quadrilogy has nine volumes. The treatise is very technical and, of course, from a Shiʿi perspective, it has ample points of weakness. In fact, some have even considered it an anti-Shiʿa book, but academically it is no doubt profound.

Although a renowned anti-Shiʿa, in this book Amīn acknowledges that Shiʿi reasoning has always been more deductive. He wants to drive home the point that the reason why Shiʿi reasoning is more deductive is that they are more familiar with speculative interpretations (taʾwīlāt).[3]Editor’s note: Taʾwīl (pl. taʾwīlāt) is a technical term that is translated here as the esoteric interpretation of the Qurʾanic text. It refers primarily to meanings of Qurʾanic statements that are beyond, yet in consonance with, the surface-level meaning of the text. For more information regarding taʾwīl, see “Qurʾanic Taʾwīl: Comparing the Views of Ibn ʿArabī and ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī. But the truth of the matter is that the ones responsible for this condition are the infallible Imams (ʿa) who have invited people to thinking and intellection. Amīn says, “For example, philosophy during the Islamic period flourished among the Shiʿa and not as much among the Sunnis. Philosophy was non-existent in Egypt until it was ruled by the Shiʿa. When the Shiʿa came, philosophy flourished. Then, as Shiʿism was no longer dominant in Egypt, philosophy also diminished and was almost non-extant until the last century when Sayyid Jamāl (who was a Shiʿa) came to Egypt and the intellectual market flourished again.” Then he (Amīn) has this pleasant expression:

والحق أن الفلسفة بالتشيع الصق منها بالتسنن

“The truth is that philosophy adheres more to Shiʿism than it does to Sunnism.”

In general, according to him, Shiʿi reasoning is more deductive. The reason for this—which perhaps he did not pay attention to—is that compared to its Sunni counterpart, the Shiʿi tradition has given more importance to it. In scholastic theology (kalām), Sunnis were divided into two opposite camps from the beginning, viz. Muʿtazilites and the Ashʿarites. The Muʿtazilites were more inclined to rationalism while the Ashʿarites leaned more to taʿabbud. The Shiʿa were with the Muʿtazilites; they had a difference of opinion with the Muʿtazilites but in principle they were together. Their commonality was that both gave more value and importance to reason and reasoning. In Shiʿi narrations, there are wondrous expressions about the intellect which cannot be found in Sunni books. Shiʿi books like al-Kāfī, Biḥār al-Anwār, and other hadith collections begin with Kitāb al-ʿAql wa-l-Jahl (The Book of Intellect and Ignorance), followed by sections on Tawḥīd, Prophethood, and Ḥujjah.[4]Tawḥīd means the belief in the Unicity of Allah, the principle belief of Islam. Ḥujjah means ‘authority’, and may refer to any means of obtaining evidentiary value to act a certain way, whether that be a religious text or religious personality, such as a prophet or imam. Of course, reason or intellect is juxtaposed with ignorance which I shall explain. We can see that Shiʿi narrations give remarkable value and respect to reason and its validity.

The Intellect (ʿaql) and Ignorance (jahl) in Islamic Aḥādīth

It is no trifling matter for an Imam to say that Allah has two types of authority (ḥujjah): an outward authority and an inward authority. The outward authority refers to the Prophets (ʿa) while the inward authority denotes the intellects of people.[5]The author is referring to the following report from Imam al-Kāẓim: يا هشام إن لله على الناس حجتين: حجة ظاهرة وحجة باطنة، فأما الظاهرة فالرسل والأنبياء والأئمة – عليهم السلام -، وأما الباطنة فالعقول. ” Hishām! God has two types of authority against humankind: an outward authority and an inward authority. The outward (authority) is the prophets, messengers, and imams—peace be upon them. The inward (authority) is the intellects. (Al-Kulaynī, Al-Kāfī, vol. 1, book 1, hadith 12, p. 16.) This hadith is an established truths among the Shiʿi aḥādīth, and can be found in al-Kāfī. Now, some may have rejected the purport of this hadith, i.e., whether or not the intellect is actually authoritative. It is not my concern here to refute this objection. In the end of the day, this concept exists (among Shiʿi aḥādīth).

It is no trifling matter for an Imam to say that Allah has two types of authority (ḥujjah): an outward authority and an inward authority. The outward authority refers to the Prophets (ʿa) while the inward authority denotes the intellects of people.

“Ignorance” (jahl) which is mentioned in this tradition is the exact opposite of intellect (ʿaql), and in Islamic narrations, ʿaql refers to the analytical faculty. In most cases you can see, Islam disparages the ignorant. As the opposite of “learned”, jāhil does not mean “illiterate.” Rather, it means the opposite of intelligent. An āqil is one who does not possess this ability. We know of many individuals who are learned yet they are jāhil. They are learned in the sense that they have outwardly vast knowledge. They know many things. Yet, their minds are nothing but storerooms. They have no ijtihād of their own.[6]Ijtihād generally means to strive or work hard. It technically refers to the process by which a person contemplates, thinks, and researches in order to come to a conclusion. In Islamic law, ijtihād would refer to the process of deriving legal conclusions from religious sources. They have no ability to inference. They cannot analyze issues. According to Islam, such people are ignorant in the sense that their intellects are dull. They may be knowledgeable but their intellects are dull.

We have heard the following narration frequently:

الحكمة ضالة المؤمن

Wisdom is the lost property of the faithful.

No doubt, wisdom means knowledge with real substance, which is profound and deep rooted and not a delusion. That is, the state of the faithful in seeking truths must be like that of a person who has lost something valuable and is always looking for it. There are other narrations which add to this. There was a time when I listed the references for this narration and I found close to twenty versions. One such reference states:

خذوا الحكمة ولو من أهل النفاق…و لو من مشرك

Acquire wisdom even from the people of hypocrisy…even if they may be polytheists.

That is, if you feel that what he has is right and is knowledge or wisdom, do not worry about whether he is an unbeliever, polytheist, impure, or non-Muslim. Go and take it. Wisdom is yours and is only borrowed by him.

أينما وجدها فهو أحق بها

“Wherever he finds it, he is more deserving of it.”

That is, whenever a believer finds wisdom, he must consider himself more worthy to possess it.

Let us not mind this (contemporary) backwards intellectual state of ours in which everything we have is negatively perceived. In the early part of the second century when the spread of Islam was at its height, suddenly texts of all sciences of those outside the Muslim world—Persians, Byzantium, Indian, Greek—were translated and introduced to the Muslim world. What was the reason behind this and why did the Muslim world not show any opposition? The reason was that there are such teachings such as this. These teachings paved the way such that if a book were found even in far-off China, there would be nothing wrong in translating it:

اطلبوا العلم ولو بالصين

Seek knowledge even if it is in China.

For example, ʿAbd Allah ibn al-Muqaffaʿ who translated the book Aristotelian Logic lived during the time of Imam al-Ṣādiq (ʿa); rather, actually from the Umayyad period, but it reached its peak during Imam al-Ṣādiq’s (ʿa) time. During the imamate of some of the Imams during the reign of the Abbasid Caliphs Hārun and Maʾmūn, texts of the primary sciences were voluminously translated. Bayt al-Ḥikmah was a school which was unprecedented in the world at the time and matchless for some time afterward.

Yes, our Imams (ʿa) were critical of the caliphs and exposed their deviations again and again. As the caliphs were accursed and rejected, the Imams (ʿa) unveiled the true colors of these people. Yet, we cannot see even a single tradition or narration of our Imams (ʿa) suggesting that efforts such as Bayt al-Ḥikmah should be treated as a bidʿah in religion.[7]Bidʿah generally means innovation. Here it refers to the technical meaning of Islam’s general prohibition of introducing changes or additions into religious practice and attributing them to religion where one has no authority to do so. The Imams could have said, “One of the harmful things to have happened to our community has been the translation of scientific texts of the unbelieving nations, such as the Greeks, Byzantines, Indians, and Persians, and the introduction of them into the Muslim world.” This was in spite of the fact that a statement like this would have been among the best means to tarnish their image with the common people. However, we have not seen even a single tradition in which this work of the caliphs was portrayed as an act of bidʿah and therefore contrary to Islam.

My point is that it is a principle which is introduced by Islam itself: “Acquire wisdom even from the people of hypocrisy.” Traditions related to this subject have excellent content. There is a tradition in our collection in which Jesus Christ (ʿa) is reported to have said:

كونوا نقاد الكلام

Be a critic of speech.

My point is that it is a principle which is introduced by Islam itself: “Acquire wisdom even from the people of hypocrisy.”

That is, just as the money-changer weighs a coin, identifying what is more or less valuable in it and taking the more valuable, likewise you must also be such with respect to speech and points of argument. We take whatever others have [which is valuable and good]. We have our own thinking and intellects. We are not afraid that we are doing something wrong by this. We think about such statements, and we take whatever is good in them and reject whatever is bad in them. Now, what is the basis for this idea: “Acquire wisdom even if it were from hypocrites, the faithless, or from polytheists?” It is this Qurʾanic injunction:

فَبَشِّرْ عِبَادِ ٱلَّذِينَ يَسْتَمِعُونَ ٱلْقَوْلَ فَيَتَّبِعُونَ أَحْسَنَهُۥٓ ۚ أُو۟لَٰٓئِكَ ٱلَّذِينَ هَدَىٰهُمُ ٱللَّهُ ۖ وَأُو۟لَٰٓئِكَ هُمْ أُو۟لُوا۟ ٱلْأَلْبَٰبِ

So give good news to My servants who listen to what is said and follow the best of it. They are the ones whom Allah has guided, and it is they who possess albāb.[8]Quran, al-Zumar (39):17-18.

A Narration from Imam Mūsā al-Kāẓim (ʿa)

There is a famous narration recorded in al-Kāfī from Imam Mūsā ibn Jaʿfar al-Kāẓim (ʿa) addressed to Hishām ibn al-Ḥakam. Hishām was one of our hadith narrators but he was a narrator who often focused on the doctrinal pillars of faith (usūl al-dīn).[9]Usūl al-Dīn translates to “Principles of Religion”, and generally refers to matters of faith, such as to believe in the Oneness of Allah, the Day of Resurrection, and the Prophethood of Mohammad (). Usūl al-Dīn can be contrasted with furūʿ al-dīn, which translates to “Branches of Religion” and refers to matters of religious practice, such as prayer, fasting, and bidding others to do good and prohibiting them from evil. In the parlance of that time, he was known as a mutakallim[10]Mutakallim refers to a scholastic theologian. although he himself would likely have been reluctant to accept this label. He used to engage with the theologians. That is, he used to discuss tawḥīd, prophethood, maʿād,[11]Maʿād generally means “to return” but here refers specifically to the belief in the Day of Resurrection. and the general principles of religion. There is a consensus of opinion among Sunnis and Shiʿa that Hishām was one of the most distinguished theologians during his time.

Recently, in preparation for writing the book A Historical Study of Mutual Services of Islam and Iran,[12]The original title in Farsi is Khadamāt-i Mutaqābil-i Islām wa Īrān. I read the very profound book, The History of the Science of Theology[13]The original title in Farsi is Tāhrīkh-i ʿIlm-i Kalām. by Shibli Nuʿmānī, the Indian scholar.  In narrating the life of Abū al-Hadhīl Allāf—an outstanding theologian who was of Persian origin and by whose hand many Zoroastrians of Persia became Muslims—I noticed that Nuʿmānī thus wrote: “Everyone would avoid debating with Abū al-Hadhīl who, in turn, would avoid debating with Hishām ibn al-Ḥakam.”

The point is that Hishām, who was highly talented, and academically and intellectually engaged, was spoken to by Imam Mūsā ibn Jaʿfar (ʿa). The Imam (ʿa) told him:

يا هشام! إن الله تبراك و تعالى بشّر أهلَ العقلِ والفهمِ في كتابِه فقال:  فَبَشِّرْ عِبَادِ ٱلَّذِينَ يَسْتَمِعُونَ ٱلْقَوْلَ فَيَتَّبِعُونَ أَحْسَنَهُ…

O Hisham! Allah, the Blessed, the Exalted, gave good news in His Book to the people of intellect and understanding: “So give good news to My servants who listen to what is said and follow the best of it. They are the ones whom Allah has guided, and it is they who possess albāb.”[14]Muhammad Bāqir al-Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, vol. 1, pg. 132, and Tuḥaf al-ʿUqūl, vol. 1, pg. 383.

The above noble verse mentions the intellect, which its basic function is analysis, filtering, and separating the correct from the incorrect.

One of the intellect’s functions is the acquisition of knowledge and learning, which is not that important. But to analyze, digest, scrutinize, and separate the correct from the incorrect, it is only then that the intellect in its true sense begins to function.

There are two excellent statements of Abū ʿAlī ibn Sīnā[15][Editor’s Note:] Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbd Allāh ibn Sīnā Balkhī, or Ibn Sīnā (c. 980-1037) was a Persian polymath, and arguably the most influential philosopher and physician of the Islamic world. that can be both found in the book al-Ishārāt. One is as follows:

من تعود أن يصدق بغير دليل فقد إنخلع من كسوة الانسانية

Whoever is accustomed to accepting a statement without any reason has ceased being human.[16]Al-Ishārāt, or in full, al-Ishārāt wa-l-Tanbīhāt was a later work of Abu ʿAlī ibn Sīnā, consisting of four parts, viz. logic, physics, metaphysics, and mysticism. [Trans.]

But to analyze, digest, scrutinize, and separate the correct from the incorrect, it is only then that the intellect in its true sense begins to function.

That is, a human being does not accept a statement without reason. On the contrary, it is also bad for a person to reject everything without any reason. He says:

كل ما قرع سمعك من العجائب فذره في بقعة الامكان ما لم يذدك عنه قائم البرهان

Regarding all the strange things that reach your ear, allow for the possibility of it, so long as you have not a proof for or against it.[17]Ibn Sīnā, al-Ishārāt wa-l-Tanbīhāt, vol. 3 (Qumm: Daftar Nashr al-Kitāb), 418.

That is, if you hear something strange, do not reject it so long as you know it could be possible, nor should you accept it outright. Say instead, “It could be so.” A real human being is one whose acceptance or rejection is based on reason, and whenever there is no authority to establish its correctness or incorrectness, that person should say, “I do not know.”

ً

The Necessity for Combining the Intellect and Knowledge

The narration of Imam [Mūsā] (ʿa) is very elaborate. I will only quote parts of it. The Imam (ʿa) then said that one must not be content with the intellect alone. The intellect must be coupled with knowledge. The intellect has an instinctive or natural state which everyone has, and knowledge enhances the intellect. The intellect must be nourished by knowledge. In Nahj al-Balāghah and other hadith collections, the intellect and knowledge are described as such. Sometimes, knowledge is called al-masmūʿ (that which is heard from outside of the self) while sometimes it is referred to as al-matbūʿ (that which is innate within the self). That is, one type of knowledge is described as ʿilm while the other type of knowledge is described as ʿaql. The difference is this: the former is called al-matbūʿ, which implies that it is innate and natural, while the latter is called al-masmūʿ implying that it is a type of acquired (iktisābī) knowledge and not innate. It is greatly emphasized that the “heard intellect” and “innate knowledge” are useful when they both function in their own respective ways. Meaning, people who are passive recipients function simply as storage vessels for pieces of information, and are strongly censured in aḥādīth.

What Bacon Says

In a famous and excellent quotation, Francis Bacon is reported to have said that learned men are of three types. Some are like ants. They always bring grains from the outside and store them. Their minds are like storage rooms. In reality, they are like tape recorders. They record whatever they hear. A second type are those who resemble silk-worms. They weave their own thread from within themselves. They are not really learned men because they do not acquire anything from the outside. They want to produce something out of their imagination. Their impending end, however, is suffocation inside their own cocoons. A third type are those who are like honeybees. They extract the juice of flowers and they produce honey from it.[18]Francis Bacon, The New Organon, Book 1, Aphorism 95.

This question of the “heard intellect” and the “innate intellect” is mentioned in the hadith. “Heard knowledge” is not sufficient if it is not accompanied by its “innate” counterpart. That is, one must digest whatever he or she has acquired from outside through this inward power–this analytical faculty–so as to produce something useful.

Then the Imam (ʿa) said:

يا هشام! ثم بيّن أن العقل مع العلم

O Hishām! It is clear that the intellect (ʿaql) is in alliance with knowledge (ʿilm).

As such, it is stated in the Qurʾanic verse:

وَتِلْكَ ٱلْأَمْثَٰلُ نَضْرِبُهَا لِلنَّاسِ ۖ وَمَا يَعْقِلُهَآ إِلَّا ٱلْعَٰلِمُونَ

And We draw these parables for mankind; but no one grasps them except those who have knowledge.[19]Qur’an, al-ʿAnkabūt (29):43.

That is, one must digest whatever he or she has acquired from outside through this inward power–this analytical faculty–so as to produce something useful.

That is, one must have knowledge at the outset. He must procure the raw material and then have the intellect to analyze it. For example, if I have a strong intellect like that of Abū ʿAlī ibn Sīnā, and the Qurʾan says that history gives very good moral lessons, but I do not have any knowledge of history, what can my intellect understand? Or, we are told that there are divine signs and symbols in this entire world of creation and at the same time I have an excellent intellect, yet I do not know the raw materials of this creation. What can I understand with my intellect, and how can I discover those divine signs? I must discover them through knowledge and understand them through my intellect.

The Question of Taqlīd

يا هشام! ثم ذم الذين لا يعلمون فقال: وَإِذَا قِيلَ لَهُمُ ٱتَّبِعُوا۟ مَآ أَنزَلَ ٱللَّهُ قَالُوا۟ بَلْ نَتَّبِعُ مَآ أَلْفَيْنَا عَلَيْهِ ءَابَآءَنَآ ۗ أَوَلَوْ كَانَ ءَابَآؤُهُمْ لَا يَعْقِلُونَ شَيْـًۭٔا وَلَا يَهْتَدُون

O Hishām! Allah has further censured those who do not exercise their reason with the words, “When they are told, ‘Follow what Allah has sent down,’ they say, ‘We would rather follow what we found our fathers following.’ What, even if their fathers neither applied reason nor were guided?”[20]Qur’an, al-Baqarah (2):170.

We have heard a lot about taqlīd. The Qurʾan has strongly opposed what is known today as “traditionalism,” or the acceptance of whatever was in the past. This sheep-like attitude in man; this blind imitation of predecessors, forefathers, or ancestors merely on the basis of their being forefathers or ancestors. I have noticed that whenever a Prophet (ʿa) encountered his people, there was one thing given emphasis and to which he called his people, but there were two or three common issues encountered by every Prophet (ʿa). Some were positive while others were negative. For example, tawḥīd is something positive presented by every Prophet (ʿa). One of the common things encountered by every Prophet (ʿa) and which every nation dealt with was the imitation of predecessors: “We do not accept what you say because it is something new and we are accustomed to the way of the past generation and our forefathers and we follow their path.” This state of submission to those who were in the past is something against reason. The Qurʾan wants man to choose his way according to his intellect. Thus, the campaign of the Qurʾan against imitation or the so-called “traditionalism” is a campaign in favor of the intellect.

Following the Majority

Another issue is that of number. Just as the sheep-like individual follows his predecessors, man wants to be identified with the majority. As the saying goes, “If you do not want to be disgraced, then join the majority.”

If the majority is a disgrace, then joining it is a disgraceful act. However, man has a strong inclination to join the majority. There are many such cases among the fuqahāʾ.[21]Fuqahāʾ (sing. faqīh) refers to the class of Islamic jurists. A faqīh infers an issue but he has no courage to express it. He would investigate and see whether or not there is a jurist or jurists who share his opinion. It is very rare for a jurist to express his fatwā (legal opinion) after he finds out that no jurist before him had issued such an edict before. That is, he is frightened when he finds out that he is alone. The same is true in other fields. These days, however, it is as if to be individual has become the fashionable thing, perhaps as the Europeans have inspired. Meaning, the situation has tilted to the other extreme. Everyone strives to be unique and to be known to have a new idea. It is the exact opposite of our predecessors. If they had something to say, our predecessors were reluctant to do it alone. In order to give the impression that they were not alone, they would mention others who share their views. Abū ʿAlī ibn Sīnā thus explained: “Whatever I say, I would quote from Aristotle because if I claim it to be my own, no one would believe it.” Mulla Sadra persisted on quoting his predecessors and explaining his ideas through their words because, at the time, following the majority was in vogue. Today, the case is the opposite. If someone says something which is already said by someone else, it no longer has value. In any case, the Qurʾan condemns taking the majority as the criterion for something being true.

The Imam (ʿa) states that the Qurʾan condemns the majority when it states:

وَإِن تُطِعْ أَكْثَرَ مَن فِى ٱلْأَرْضِ يُضِلُّوكَ عَن سَبِيلِ ٱللَّهِ ۚ إِن يَتَّبِعُونَ إِلَّا ٱلظَّنَّ وَإِنْ هُمْ إِلَّا يَخْرُصُونَ

If you obey most of those on the earth, they will lead you astray from the way of Allah. They follow nothing but conjectures and they do nothing but surmise.[22]Qurʾan, al-Anʿām (6):116.

That is, if you follow the majority of people, you will be misguided because they do not follow reason; they follow conjecture and speculation. They follow whatever they speculate. Since most people are like that, you must not trust the majority.

This is in itself another way of giving independence to the intellect and an invitation to the fact that the intellect is the criterion for something being correct.

Not Following the Whims and Caprice of People

The Imam (ʿa) continued in the hadith, saying, “O Hishām! Do not trust what people say. Do not trust their judgement. The judgement must be yours. O Hishām! If there is a walnut in your hand and people say that what is in your hand is a pearl, you should not be deceived by them, since you know that it is indeed a walnut. On the contrary, if you have a pearl in your hand and everyone you meet says that it is a walnut, you should not believe them. If all people say that it is a walnut where in fact it is not, you must follow your own judgement, intellect, and reason as your guide.”

The discussion on intellect ends here for now…We have many citations from the Qurʾan and the sunnah regarding the intellect, and I think we have discussed enough as it relates to education. Islam advocates nourishment, development, and independence of the intellect, and does not advocate its suppression, undermining, or extinction.

Notes   [ + ]

1. Qurʾan, al-Zumar (39):17-18.
2. Editor’s note: The Arabic word sunnah can be generally translated as “tradition” or “norm.” In the parlance of Shiʿi Islam it refers to the speech and actions of the Prophet Mohammad and the Imams ().
3. Editor’s note: Taʾwīl (pl. taʾwīlāt) is a technical term that is translated here as the esoteric interpretation of the Qurʾanic text. It refers primarily to meanings of Qurʾanic statements that are beyond, yet in consonance with, the surface-level meaning of the text. For more information regarding taʾwīl, see “Qurʾanic Taʾwīl: Comparing the Views of Ibn ʿArabī and ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī.
4. Tawḥīd means the belief in the Unicity of Allah, the principle belief of Islam. Ḥujjah means ‘authority’, and may refer to any means of obtaining evidentiary value to act a certain way, whether that be a religious text or religious personality, such as a prophet or imam.
5. The author is referring to the following report from Imam al-Kāẓim: يا هشام إن لله على الناس حجتين: حجة ظاهرة وحجة باطنة، فأما الظاهرة فالرسل والأنبياء والأئمة – عليهم السلام -، وأما الباطنة فالعقول. ” Hishām! God has two types of authority against humankind: an outward authority and an inward authority. The outward (authority) is the prophets, messengers, and imams—peace be upon them. The inward (authority) is the intellects. (Al-Kulaynī, Al-Kāfī, vol. 1, book 1, hadith 12, p. 16.)
6. Ijtihād generally means to strive or work hard. It technically refers to the process by which a person contemplates, thinks, and researches in order to come to a conclusion. In Islamic law, ijtihād would refer to the process of deriving legal conclusions from religious sources.
7. Bidʿah generally means innovation. Here it refers to the technical meaning of Islam’s general prohibition of introducing changes or additions into religious practice and attributing them to religion where one has no authority to do so.
8. Quran, al-Zumar (39):17-18.
9. Usūl al-Dīn translates to “Principles of Religion”, and generally refers to matters of faith, such as to believe in the Oneness of Allah, the Day of Resurrection, and the Prophethood of Mohammad (). Usūl al-Dīn can be contrasted with furūʿ al-dīn, which translates to “Branches of Religion” and refers to matters of religious practice, such as prayer, fasting, and bidding others to do good and prohibiting them from evil.
10. Mutakallim refers to a scholastic theologian.
11. Maʿād generally means “to return” but here refers specifically to the belief in the Day of Resurrection.
12. The original title in Farsi is Khadamāt-i Mutaqābil-i Islām wa Īrān.
13. The original title in Farsi is Tāhrīkh-i ʿIlm-i Kalām.
14. Muhammad Bāqir al-Majlisī, Biḥār al-Anwār, vol. 1, pg. 132, and Tuḥaf al-ʿUqūl, vol. 1, pg. 383.
15. [Editor’s Note:] Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbd Allāh ibn Sīnā Balkhī, or Ibn Sīnā (c. 980-1037) was a Persian polymath, and arguably the most influential philosopher and physician of the Islamic world.
16. Al-Ishārāt, or in full, al-Ishārāt wa-l-Tanbīhāt was a later work of Abu ʿAlī ibn Sīnā, consisting of four parts, viz. logic, physics, metaphysics, and mysticism. [Trans.]
17. Ibn Sīnā, al-Ishārāt wa-l-Tanbīhāt, vol. 3 (Qumm: Daftar Nashr al-Kitāb), 418.
18. Francis Bacon, The New Organon, Book 1, Aphorism 95.
19. Qur’an, al-ʿAnkabūt (29):43.
20. Qur’an, al-Baqarah (2):170.
21. Fuqahāʾ (sing. faqīh) refers to the class of Islamic jurists.
22. Qurʾan, al-Anʿām (6):116.

A Drop in the Sea: The Life and Character of Mirza al-Shirazi

How do we live a life of both knowledge and piety, of critical investigation and a profound faith in the Unseen? Traditionally, Muslims would listen to and share anecdotes from the lives of their eminent scholars, to draw inspiration on how to combine the seemingly conflicting virtues of scholarship and devotion. In the process, they would keep alive the memory of those pious figures, and connect themselves to the legacies those scholars bestowed to the larger community.

One such exemplary scholar was Sayyid Muhammad Ḥasan al-Shīrāzī, also known as Mīrzā al-Shīrāzī, whose piety and scholarship were revered far beyond the confines of the seminaries of higher learning. Mīrzā al-Shīrāzī was born in 1230 A.H./1814 C.E., to a scholarly family in Shiraz, and began his studies from a very young age in that city. He traveled first to the city of Isfahan, then to the seminaries of Iraq to continue his education. He was one of the most distinguished disciples of the singular marjiʾ of his time, Shaykh Murṭaḍā al-Anṣārī, who he succeeded as the primary marjiʿ of the Shiʿi world. Later, Mīrzā al-Shīrāzī moved to the predominantly Sunni city of Samarra, establishing that city as a center of Shiʿi learning for generations of scholars after him. It was in Samarra that he issued his famous decree banning tobacco use, so as to oppose the Qajar Nasir al-Din Shah’s 1889 concession to a British corporation. The concession had given the British a monopoly on all tobacco produced, sold, and exported from Iran. This decree of Mīrzā al-Shīrāzī was one of his lasting legacies, not only because of its effectiveness in ending the concession in a matter of months, but also for its later social and political ramifications in Iranian society. Mīrzā al-Shīrāzī died in 1312 A.H./1895 C.E., and is buried in Najaf.

The following anecdotes are reported by the contemporary marjiʿ, Sayyid Mūsā al-Shubayrī al-Zanjānī, and collected in his book, Jurʿeh-yi az Daryā. They are presented in a casual yet authoritative tone. On the one hand, they mirror the tradition of hadith-reports that begin by mentioning a chain of narrators; on the other, they are accounts by some of Mīrzā’s closest students and devotees of his personal virtues and erudition. We hope that these anecdotes can inspire ways of living a life of virtue, and can renew a memory and connection to those pious scholars within the Shiʿi tradition.

Transliteration note: This article was translated from Persian, and will reflect the original language of the author. It will generally not reflect the Arabic-specific transliteration standards, for example the definite article (al-) before names, e.g. “Mīrzā Shīrāzī”.


The Four Pillars

All four pillars of a true scholar—characteristics which if found in someone indicate that he is worthy of the status and rank of marjiʿiyyah—were present in the person of Mīrzā Shīrāzī. These characteristics are: an unparalleled scholarship and knowledge, piety and fear of God, a completely virtuous character, and, finally, an unmatched intellect. These four characteristics were present in their most perfect form in the person of Mīrzā Shīrāzī. No one can doubt the scholarship and knowledge of Mīrzā. Even if there were no evidence of his knowledge other than his students and disciples, they would suffice in proving his scholarship. The very fact that every true thinker and scholar after Mīrzā was trained by him proves the greatness of his scholarship. This is similar to Waḥid Bihbahānī, who trained students like the great Baḥr al-ʿUlūm, Ṣāḥib al-Rīyāḍ, Kāshif al-Ghiṭāʾ, Mīrzā Mahdī Shahristānī, Sayyid Muḥsin Aʿrajī and Mulla Mahdī Narāqī. The caliber of these students testifies to the excellent level of Bihbahānī’s own scholarship.

In Shiʿi history, there are two scholars—two true masters—whose students were the most important scholars of their [respective] eras: one is Waḥīd Bihbahānī, the other, Mīrzā Shīrāzī.

A Father’s Test

Additionally, Mīrzā Shīrāzī truly loved scholarship. Meaning, in addition to the fact that he was a profound thinker and master-scholar, he also had a special affinity for learning. I have heard the following examples in support of this:

One such case is the following: Sayyid Ḥājj Mahdī Rūḥānī narrates from his uncle, the late Sayyid Aḥmad, who in turn narrates from the late Sayyid Abd al-Hādī, and he from the late Mīrzā ʿAlī Shīrāzī, the son of Mīrzā [Shīrāzī], who was a marjīʿ al-taqlīd in his own right. Mīrzā ʿAlī said, “Towards the end of Mīrzā’s final illness, his health had deteriorated to such an extent that it wasn’t clear whether he had passed or was still alive. We had to somehow determine his state. One person said to Mīrzā, ‘A dignitary on behalf of the Ottoman government has come to visit your graciousness.’ The signs of life did not appear in Mīrzā’s body. Another said, “The Iranian ambassador has come to pay his respects.’ But there was still no effect.”

Mīrzā ʿAlī then said, “I know how to test my father’s state of consciousness.” He then whispers in the ear of Mīrzā Shīrāzī, “What is the ruling of burnt bread?” Mīrzā stirs. Then he says, “How shall we determine its ruling? Insofar as it falls under the category of eating the repulsive (khabīthah), should we say that it is forbidden? Or should we say that it is forbidden insofar as it is harmful? Or do we say that if we were to prohibit it, then the unburnt bread that is mixed with the burnt would also be wasted? The corollary of this prohibition, therefore, would be the prohibition of another thing [that was not originally prohibited], and this causes a conflict in act. From this respect then, should we say that the prohibition is not in effect?” Mīrzā analyzed all those derivations while in that state on his deathbed.

Unbroken Silence

I heard from the late Shaykh Riḍā Zanjānī, who narrated from the late Shaykh [Abd al-Karīm Hāʾirī,] who said, “We were sitting in Mīrzā’s lecture, when one of Mīrzā’s top-tier students began a side discussion (I believe it may have been Sayyid Muḥammad Fishārakī or someone else who was also among his most prominent students). In the middle of his lecture, Mīrzā says to Sayyid Muḥammad, “Sir, please be quiet.” Sayyid Muḥammad is dismayed, and says, “Sir, we were both talking. Why do you single me out for reproach? Why do you only direct your criticism to me? Why do you only address me?” (This next section was reported by Shaykh Murtaḍā Ḥāʾirī.) It is at this moment that Mīrzā says, “These issues that you are just now considering, we thought about and resolved 40 years ago. We even considered other issues [that you have not even thought of.]” Mīrzā becomes upset. He falls into a total and unbroken silence, and no one else would dare speak. (This next section was also narrated by Shaykh Riḍā Zanjānī.) After a long while, Mīrzā Muḥammad Taqī Shīrāzī tried to break the silence. He asked a question about a passage from Shaykh [Anṣārī’s] book on ritual purity. He asked, “Sir, what does this statement of the Shaykh mean?” And Mīrzā proceeds to explain the text.

[The late Shaykh Abd al-Karīm Ḥāʾirī][1]It should be noted that Shaykh ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Hāʾirī was one of the preeminent marājīʿ of his time, and reestablished the Qumm seminary in the 20th century. Shaykh al-Hāʿirī’s own intellectual achievement is what makes his following statement so exceptional. said, “I am so full of regret that I did not write what [Mīrzā] said in response. Afterward, however much we tried to make sense of that passage, we could not decipher it. We simply could not understand what Shaykh [al-Anṣārī] was attempting to convey. It seems that [the passage] was not clear for Mīrzā Muḥammad Taqī either.”

This anecdote provides an insight into how astute but critical Mīrzā was of his own intellectual positions. At times, when we approach a tradition as long lasting and intricate as Islamic law or legal theory, it is difficult to appreciate how critical scholars can be of that tradition’s received conclusions. As this anecdote shows, eminent Shiʿi scholars are constantly engaged in the process of reconsidering the fatāwā and conclusions of their forebearers. At the same time, those scholars understand their precarious position as stewards of God’s law, and recognize their own intellectual limitations. Thus, they are careful to not reach hasty conclusions or overrule fatāwā of their predecessors, particularly those that have passed the test of time, lasting the critical scrutiny of multiple generations of previous scholars. There are some parallels here to other academic disciplines, like the various fields of science or law, where the consensus of a community of scholars is treated with value and thoughtful consideration. These two qualities, of critical renewal but also of a reluctance to diverge from received wisdom, characterize the internal logic that animates Islamic law, a logic that can be difficult for a person not steeped in the Islamic legal tradition to decipher. 

In addition, the anecdote is telling of Mīrzā’s self-restraint. His measured response to his student’s unfounded criticism is telling not only of his erudition, but of his total command of his behavior; in the face of a frustrating situation, he chose silence.

Adults and children recite the Qurʼan in the sanctuary outside the holy burial site of Imam Husayn (ʿa).

Intellectual Acuity

In terms of his thinking, he had an incredibly astute and dexterous mind. In general, Najafi-style discussions and Samarra’i-style discussion are fundamentally different; they abide by two entirely different methods. Conclusive statements are a hallmark of Najafi scholars, whereas uncertainty and inconclusive statements are the signature method of Samarra’ī scholars. Shaykh Mujtahidi used to phrase it in this way: the quintessential word of Najafis was “Indeed,” (innamā) whereas the quintessential word of Samarrāʾī scholars was “Perhaps” (laʿalla).

Anyway, because Mīrzā’s mind was so adroit, he would frequently reconsider his scholarly positions. He was also a very pious and God-fearing individual. If he wanted to simply present his juridical decree (fatwā) quickly and without due consideration, he would fall in dubious legal territory. Hence he would frequently say, “Obey precaution [in this issue],” and would rarely present his juridical decree. Sometimes arguments are made against a jurist who calls to precaution (iḥityāṭ), namely that it causes undue burden and is difficult to abide by. Some jurists defend the call to legal precaution by stating, “Mīrzā fulfilled the role of marjī-i taqlid for a very long time, and he would call his followers to abide by precaution. And yet, this call to precaution did not cause any major problems or conflicts.”

Both in terms of his knowledge and scholarship and in terms of his piety the Mīrzā was unanimously revered and deferred to by all the eminent students and scholars of his time, all of whom were exceptional in their own piety and other qualities. Take, for example, Mīrzā Muḥammad Taqī Shīrāzī. Even Fāḍil Ardakānī—who was a peer of Shaykh Anṣārī and then held the same rank as Mīrzā Shīrāzī—called others to follow Mīrzā’s juridical opinions. He would take issue with anyone else who would write their own legal manuals (and declare their marjīʿiyyah), saying, “Has it been somehow ordained that every other person will write a legal manual? The Mīrzā is a great scholar and is also very pious.”

Mīrzā’s Forbearance

Hajj Sayyid Abū al-Faḍl Zanjānī would narrate the following from his father, Ḥājj Sayyid Muḥammad Zanjānī, “I once visited Mīrzā, and he was busy responding to a legal query (istiftāʾ). A sayyid entered, and requested some (financial) assistance. Mīrzā didn’t attend to him. The sayyid then snapped, “On the Day of Judgment, all this gold and silver will become snakes and scorpions. It will all become fire, and will be hung from your neck!”

Mīrzā’s acquaintances and servants wanted to force the man out because of his disrespectful behavior, but Mīrzā, who had the highest level of adab, did not permit them to do so, and forbade them from bothering the man. He called the man back, and when he returned, Mīrzā apologized, saying, “I was in the middle of responding to a legal query and didn’t notice your request.” He then gave the man some money, and the man left. As he was leaving, the only response that Mīrzā uttered was, “It is clear that this gentleman’s utter desperation has caused him to lose his patience.” This is all that Mīrzā said in response [to that man’s disrespect.]

Don’t Involve Yourself!

Mīrzā Shīrāzī’s intellectual genius is universally accepted. Many anecdotes are reported in this regard. For example, there was a time (in Samarra) when tensions between the Shiʿa and Sunni were very high, to such an extent that it led to some violent and fatal conflicts. The situation was so dire that the late Shaykh Mujtahidi Tabrizi narrates from Hajj Shaykh Abd al-Karim Ha’iri, who said, “There was some furniture and wares in our basement that needed to be moved and relocated to a different house. We called a porter, and however much we urged him to come and assist in moving the wares, he would refuse. He was afraid that if he were to enter the basement, he would be held and then killed. Anyway, the situation in those days was that difficult and tense.

It was during such circumstances that the British sent an envoy to Mīrzā to assist him. The envoy said, “We will provide you with whatever assistance you request. We are at your service.” Mīrzā responded, “This is a domestic dispute. Two brothers are having a disagreement. It is not right for an outsider to involve himself. We will resolve this ourselves; the situation does not call for your involvement.”

In short, he did not accept their offer. The Ottoman sultan got wind of this event. He, in turn, sent the following notice: “Mīrzā is to be obeyed in whatever issue he ordains. Act according to his decree.” But Mīrzā does not permit this (either).

Mīrzā’s Acuity and Astuteness

Mīrzā was an incredibly intelligent person, and was profoundly perceptive and discerning. Ḥājj Sayyid Riḍā Ṣadr narrated a story from the famous public lecturer, Ḥājj Shaykh Ansari,[2]This is not the famous Shaykh Murṭaḍā al-Anṣārī, who was a teacher of Mīrzā al-Shīrāzī. who in turn narrated from Shaykh ʿAbd al-Karīm Hāʾirī, who said:

Towards the end of Mirzā’s life, when Mīrzā’s authority and legitimacy were both extensively acknowledged, it was hard to get an audience with him, because of the large number of meetings people requested. Of course, he was very advanced in age, and there were many issues for him to attend to. Therefore, every few days or so, he would hold a public audience so as to attend to the concerns of all the people who wanted to visit him. During one of these public sessions, some individuals noticed that Mīrzā is paying attention to a particular individual. Regardless of whoever else proceeds to pay their respects to Mīrzā, he still has his attention set on that individual. Until finally, it is that individual’s turn to step forward and pay his respects to Mīrzā. Mīrzā asks him, for example, “Where are you from?” The man responds, “From Karbala.” Mīrzā asks, “Why have you come here?” He says, “I have come to study here in Samarra.” Mīrzā then says, “I command you return to Karbala immediately. I will provide for you the same stipend and privileges of the students who study in this city, but in Karbala. You must return to Karbala immediately.”

Mīrzā then calls his servant and asks him, “When does the [next] train depart?” He says, for example, “Half an hour from now.” Mīrzā then says, “Take this man to the train [station] immediately, and wait there until he is able to embark for Karbala. Then, you may return.”

Half an hour or so later, Mīrzā continues to ask, “Why has the servant not returned?” He was anxiously waiting as he counted down the minutes until his servant’s arrival. Finally, the servant returned, and Mīrzā says, “Did you send him on his way?” He says, “Yes.” Mīrzā replies, “Were you personally there when the train departed?” He responds, “Yes.” Mīrzā asks, “So his departure is final?” He says, “Yes.” Mīrzā would continuously ask until it was certain that the individual had returned to Karbala.

Later, some of those close to Mīrzā asked him, “Why did you have this individual return to Karbala with such determination?” He responded, “I deciphered from this individual’s appearance that if he were to remain in Samarra, he would disrupt all the work we have done here by just reciting certain curses.[3]Mīrzā was concerned here that the student would recite curses against individuals revered by other Islamic schools of thought. All the work we have done and all the difficulties we have endured in successfully quelling the disputes between the Sunnis and the Shiʿa so that this city may become a center for the Shiʿa, these would all be ruined because of one such act. All that effort would be for naught if he were to recite a single curse in the ḥaram [of Samarra].”

Later, some people reported meeting that individual, and he said, “What a decent man Mīrzā is! He didn’t even let me recite a single [curse!]”

This story is telling of the incredible sagacity and astuteness of Mīrzā. He was aware and sensitive to such issues, and could discern the attitudes and behaviors of people simply by seeing them.

The Perfection of Virtues

In short, Mīrzā was an incredible person. One could dare say that such an individual, who has acquired all these disparate perfections within himself, is rare among our scholars. He was a person who was both at the peak of scholarship, and was also an exemplar of virtuosity; he had both immense piety, and a profound intellect.

 

Notes   [ + ]

1. It should be noted that Shaykh ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Hāʾirī was one of the preeminent marājīʿ of his time, and reestablished the Qumm seminary in the 20th century. Shaykh al-Hāʿirī’s own intellectual achievement is what makes his following statement so exceptional.
2. This is not the famous Shaykh Murṭaḍā al-Anṣārī, who was a teacher of Mīrzā al-Shīrāzī.
3. Mīrzā was concerned here that the student would recite curses against individuals revered by other Islamic schools of thought.

The Heritage of Scholars: A Review of Agha Buzurg al-Tihrani’s al-Dhariʿah

One way of uncovering the intellectual depth of a community is to look at the scholarly works that community has produced since its inception. In the following detailed synopsis, Dr. Aun Hasan Ali explores a renowned work in bibliographical studies, al-Dharīʿah ilā Taṣānīf al-Shiʿah, by Aqā Buzurg Tihrānī, a unique and indispensable work that provides us a glimpse into the vast intellectual legacy of Shiʿi scholarship.

Aqā Buzurg was born in 1293 A.H./1875 C.E. to a scholarly family in Tehran, Iran, and studied in Tehran, Najaf, and Samarrā under the most eminent scholars of his time, including Mīrzā Husayn Nūrī, Ākhūnd Muḥammad Kāẓim al-Khurāsānī, and Muḥammad Taqī al-Shīrāzī, all students of the famous Mīrzā Shīrāzī.[1]For more information regarding Mīrzā Shīrāzī’s life and personality, see A Drop in the Sea: The Life and Character of Mīrzā al-Shīrāzī.  He died in the year 1389 A.H./1970 C.E., and is buried in his personal library in Najaf.


 

Al-Dharīʿah ilā Taṣānīf al-Shīʿah by Muḥammad Muḥsin, known as Āqā Buzurg Tihrānī (d. 1970), is a comprehensive bibliographical study of Imāmī Shiʿi works written before its composition in 1958. The Beirut edition (1983) is comprised of 25 parts in 28 volumes. It contains 53,510 entries on a broad range of subjects, including Qurʾanic exegesis, hadith, law, theology, science, history, poetry, and belles lettres. Arabic, Persian, Turkish and Urdu titles are listed in alphabetical order.

But al-Dharīʿah is more than just a list of works. Āqā Buzurg added informative introductions to major topics and also discussed the history and transmission of texts. Works that are known by more than one title are cross-referenced, and the sources of references to works that are no longer extant are mentioned. Individual entries range in length from just a few lines to several pages. Many entries include a summary of the contents of the book and a list of manuscripts and printed editions. Volumes 9/1 to 9/4 contain material on poetry. Volume 16 and onward contain author indexes. A separate index of authors called Muʿjam Muʾallifī al-Shīʿah by ʿAlī al-Fāḍil al-Qāʾīnī was published in 1984. Volumes 17 onwards include titles of Ismāʿīlī works listed in Ismāʿīl b. ʿAbd al-Rasūl’s (d. 1769 or 70) Fihrist al-Kutub wa-l-Rasāʾil, on which W. Ivanow based his A Guide to Ismaili Literature. In cases where the identity of an author is not clear, Āqā Buzurg reviews the evidence and at times offers his own valued opinion. However, some people have criticized the attribution of particular works. Āqā Buzurg’s son ʿAlī Naqī Munzavī has noted these criticisms in the entry on his father in Ṭabaqāt Aʿlām al-Shīʿah.

Al-Dharīʿah is said to have been written in response to Taʾrīkh Ādāb al-Lughat al-ʿArabīyah by Jurjī Zaydān (d. 1914), which slighted the contribution of Shīʿīs to Arabic literature. Āqā Buzurg began working on it in 1911 in Sāmarrā in Iraq. At the time of his death, twenty-four volumes had been published. Volume 25 was published in 1978, and a supplement entitled Mustadrakāt al-Muʾallif was published in 1985. With the exception of volumes thirteen and fourteen, which were edited by Muḥammad Ṣādiq Baḥr al-ʿUlūm, the entire work was edited by Āqā Buzurg’s sons, ʿAlī Naqī and Aḥmad Munzavī. The contents of al-Dharīʿah are based on Āqā Buzurg’s own research, his visits to private and public libraries all over the Middle East, and the catalogues of libraries in Europe, Turkey, and South Asia.

There are a number of mistakes in the published edition. Much of the responsibility for these mistakes falls on the shoulders of the editors, who made changes to the original manuscript. Recently, several scholars have undertaken the task of correcting these mistakes. Al-Sayyid ʿAbd al-Azīz al-Ṭabāṭabāʾī al-Yazdī (d. 1995) wrote a supplement to al-Dharīʿah that has been published; al-Sayyid Saʿīd Akhtar al-Riḍawī al-Hindī (d. 2002) wrote Takmilat al-Dharīʿah,[2]Nuskhah Paẓūhī, 2 (1426 A.H.): 537-93 which includes works written after 1958, particularly works by South Asian ʿulamāʾ; al-Sayyid al-Riḍawī also wrote al-Taʿlīqāt ʿalā al-Dharīʿah[3]Nuskhah Paẓūhī 3 (1427 A.H.): 627-82 in which he corrected several titles and biographical details; and al-Sayyid Aḥmad al-Ḥusaynī al-Ishkawarī made a number of corrections in ʿAlā Hāmish al-Dharīʿah.[4]Nuskhah Paẓūhī, 3 (1427 A.H.): 597-661.

Notes   [ + ]

1. For more information regarding Mīrzā Shīrāzī’s life and personality, see A Drop in the Sea: The Life and Character of Mīrzā al-Shīrāzī.
2. Nuskhah Paẓūhī, 2 (1426 A.H.): 537-93
3. Nuskhah Paẓūhī 3 (1427 A.H.): 627-82
4. Nuskhah Paẓūhī, 3 (1427 A.H.): 597-661.

Qurʾanic Taʾwīl: Comparing the Views of Ibn ʿArabī and ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī

In this article, Shaykh Hamid Raza Fazil explores two central issues regarding the Qur’an: how do we understand the words of the Qur’an? And how do those words point us towards the ultimate goal of the Qur’an, the ethical and metaphysical realities that underlie and compose our existence? Shaykh Fazil explores these questions through the views of two major Qur’anic mufassirs in Islamic history: the 6th-century mystic, Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn ʿArabī, and the 20th-century mufassir and philosopher-sage, ʿAllāmah Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Ṭabāṭabāʾī.

This article is translated by Dr. Syed Rizwan Zamir, associate professor of religion at Davidson College in Davidson, North Carolina. The Qurʾanic translations are loosely based on Arberry’s The Koran Interpreted: A Translation.


Introduction

God Almighty says: “It is He who sent down upon thee the Book, wherein are verses clear that are the Essence of the Book, and others ambiguous. As for those in whose hearts is swerving, they follow the ambiguous part, desiring dissension, and desiring its interpretation; and none knows its interpretation, save only God. And those firmly rooted in knowledge say, ‘We believe in it; all is from our Lord’; yet none remembers, but men possessed of minds.”[1]Qurʾan, Āl ʿImrān (3):5.

In this brief article, we will explore the reality of taʾwīl, a Qurʾanic concept about which there is significant disagreement among scholars. First, however, the difference between the related terms tafsīr and taʾwīl needs to be clarified. Although some scholars consider these two terms to be the same, and have in fact themselves engaged more in taʾwil instead of tafsīr, more precise scholars (muḥaqqiqūn) affirm a difference between the two.

Tafsīr

Dictionaries define tafsīr in the following way: (1) to discuss and explain something (fassara al-bayān); (2) to lift a veil (kashf al-qināʿ); and (3) to lift a veil from the face of someone (kashf al-mughaṭṭā).[2]Lisān al-ʿArab, s.v. “f-s-r.” In its technical usage, tafsīr refers to “the meaning of Qurʾanic verses, and the discovering what is intended by them and what they are referring to.” (Wa-huwa bayānu maʿānī al-ayāt al-qurʾāniyyah wa-l-kashf ʿan maqāṣidiha wa-madālīliha)[3]Tafsīr al-Mīzān, vol. 1 (Beirut: Muʾassasah al-Aʿlamī li-l-Maṭbūʿāt, 1390 S.H.), p.4. In other words, to discuss the meaning of the Quranic verses and to lift veils from its hidden purport (madlūlāt) is called tafsīr. Therefore, translation pertains to the outward meaning, whereas tafsīr deals with a veiled meaning.

Taʾwīl

Dictionaries define it as, “to return a thing [to its origin],” (al-awl: al-rujūʿ—awwala illayh al-shayʾ—rajaʿahu).[4]Lisān al-ʿArab, s.v. “a-w-l.” From this general meaning, our discussion pertains specifically to taʾwīl of Qurʾanic verses. Well-known exegetes and religious scholars explain its technical meaning as any act or statement taken to its finality and end. For example, if a verse has various meanings, the one that becomes the final meaning will be called its taʾwīl. Similarly, if a person carries out an act without clarity about its final goal and only determines its goal afterwards, it will be called taʾwīl.

Examples include: (1) the story of Moses (ʿa) and Khidr (ʿa), where, Khidr (ʿa) carried out some acts in Moses’s company—acts whose goal was unclear, and faced objections from Moses (ʿa). In the end, Khidr (ʿa) explained his objectives, namely, that the reason for boring a hole in the boat was to protect it from an unjust and oppressive ruler. He said, “As for the ship, it belonged to certain poor men, who toiled upon the sea; and I desired to damage it, for behind them there was a king who was seizing every ship by brute force.” (Qurʾan, al-Kahf (18):79.). (2) If a person sees a dream, and its meaning is unclear, then it is called taʾwīl. For example, when Joseph (ʿa) saw a dream and found it occurring in the outside world (khārij), he said, “’See, father,’ he said, ‘this is the interpretation of my vision of long ago; my Lord has made it true.’”[5]Qurʾan, Yūsuf (12):100.

Similarly if there are specific meanings and secrets hidden in the speech of the speaker that constitute his or her final goal and objective, they are called taʾwīl. This is the same meaning of taʾwil that the Qurʾan refers to, namely the deeper meanings of God’s words and their final aims which are disclosed to the human person.

Taʾwīl According to Ibn ʿArabī

In Ibn ‘Arabi’s view, taʾwīl can be of two types:

  1. Blameworthy: When theologians and philosophers attempt to explain away the outward aspects of a verse when it appears contradictory to reason. This is blameworthy taʾwīl because they employ their deficient reason to explain the verse.
  2. Praiseworthy: The way of the folk of Allah and the gnostics (ʿurafāʾ), which he also names a “sign” (ishārah). Gnostics employ their unveiling (kashf) and witnessing (shuhūd) to understand Qurʾanic verses; the hidden meaning (maʿānī bāṭiniyyah) that is bestowed to them by Allah, the Most Exalted, through inspiration is called taʾwīl. For Ibn ʿArabī, it is this taʾwīl that is praiseworthy.

The first type of taʾwīl is the way of the theologians and philosophers. Ibn ʿArabī does not deem it valid. Attempting to avoid the term “people of taʾwīl” (ahl al-taʾwīl) for himself, he instead calls them [i.e., theologians and philosophers] the people of taʾwīl. [That said], he ascribes the particular taʾwīl to gnostics, referring to the verse, “[A]nd none knows its interpretation (taʾwīl), save only God. And those firmly rooted in knowledge say, ‘We believe in it; all is from our Lord’; yet none remembers, but men possessed of minds.” [6]Qurʾan, Āl ʿImrān (3):7.

For Ibn ʿArabī, “those firmly rooted in knowledge” are the gnostics, because human thinking does not intervene in their teachings. He also calls them “people of signs.” In his view, just as the descent of the Qurʾan is from God, the Most Exalted, similarly, the understanding of the Qurʾan also descends from God, the Most Exalted, upon the hearts of the believers. Hence understanding also comes from God. However, the text of the Qurʾan is not limited by these esoteric meanings. Rather, new meanings are always found.[7]Muḥyi al-Dīn ibn al-ʿArabī, “Maʿrifat al-Ishārāt,” in al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyyah, vol. 10 (n.p., n.d.), p. 279. See also, Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, Falsafat al-Taʾwīl (al-Markaz al-Thiqāfī al-ʿArabī, 2014), p. 267-8. )

Taʾwīl According to ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī

ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī, in his book, Tafsīr al-Mizān, mentions the following regarding the reality behind taʾwīl:

الحق في تفسير التأويل أنه الحقيقة الواقعية التي تستند اليها البينات القرانية من حكم او موعظة او حكمة… وأنه ليس من قبيل المفاهيم المدلول عليها بالافاظ

The reality behind explaining the taʾwīl (tafsīr altaʾwīl), is that it is true (extra-mental) reality, and the Qurʾanic verses, whether those that convey Islamic laws, exhortations, or some intellectual wisdom, all are based and sourced in that reality…this reality is not a purely conceptual one that can be referred to by words.[8]al-Mīzān, vol. 3, p. 49.

المراد بتأويل الآية ليس مفهوما من المفاهيم تدل عليه الآية…بل هو من قبيل الأمور الخارجية…

What is meant by the taʾwīl of a verse is not a type of concept that can be completely indicated by or contained within that verse…rather it is of a type that refers to an external reality.[9]al-Mīzān, vol. 3, p. 46-7.

وتاويل القران هو المأخوذ الذي يأخذ منه معارفه‏

The tawʾīl of the Qurʾan is derived. From it, in turn, is derived profound understanding and knowledge.[10]al-Mīzān, vol. 3, p. 23.

For ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī, taʾwīl is not a question of words and meaning, but instead refers to an objective reality. Words, after all, provide signification (dalālah) to bring the mind closer to this reality. But it is not possible for words to encompass and exhaust that reality’s scope. Words only indicate. The reality of the Qurʾan is contained in the protected tablet (al-lawḥ al-maḥfūẓ), which is with us is the form of words in the book. These words and their meanings are not taʾwīl; rather taʾwīl is that true objective reality from which all knowledge/gnosis, Qurʾanic prescriptions, injunctions, and wisdom draw their life. The words of the Qurʾan are reflections of this reality, which is the esoteric Qurʾan; access to this reality and taʾwīl is for God, the Most Exalted, and the Pure Infallibles.

Who are these Infallibles? Allah has mentioned them in Sūrat al-Aḥzāb: “People of the House, God only desires to put away from you abomination and to cleanse you.” Therefore, only Ahl al-Bayt can carry out the taʾwīl of the Qurʾan. It is this meaning of taʾwīl that helps us understand the Qurʾanic verse, “All that is wet and dry is within the Qurʾan,”[11]Qurʾan, al-Anʿām (6):59. “Not a grain in the earth’s shadows, not a thing, fresh or withered, but it is in a Book Manifest. and that is possible only when we place the Ahl al-Bayt alongside the Qurʾan. It is so because according to the Qurʾan and hadith-reports the Noble Prophet (ṣ) and his Ahl al-Bayt are the only Holy Beings (dhawāt muqaddasah) that have access to the Qurʾan. This also clarifies those aḥādīth that declare, “Without us, the Ahl al-Bayt, you cannot understand the Qurʾan.”[12]Comparable aḥādīth include the following hadith from Imam al-Bāqir (ʿa): “Only a liar will claim to have collected the entire Qurʾan as it was revealed [other than the Ahl al-Bayt.]  None have compiled, memorized, and preserved [the Qurʾan] exactly as Allah revealed except for ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib and the Imams after him.” (Al-Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, vol. 1 (Tehran: Dār al-Kutub al-Islāmiyyah, 1407), hadith #1, p. 228) And: “…only he who is addressed by the Qurʾan truly knows it.” (Al-Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, vol 8, hadith #485, p. 311.) For more such aḥādīth, see Muḥsin al-Fayḍ al-Kāshānī, “Towards the Sacred Text: The Importance and Value of the Qurʾan in the Life of a Believer,” translated by Azhar Sheraze. Therefore, Ahl al-Bayt are needed in every era to understand the Qurʾan. The reality of the Shiʿi interpretive tradition is also made clear through this meaning of taʾwīl. They claim that they derive religion and its teachings from Ahl al-Bayt. No companion of the Prophet, other than the Ahl al-Bayt, has claimed a special access to the true reality of the Qurʾan. This claim is only made in the Shiʿi tradition, whose source is the teachings of Ahl al-Bayt.

Synthesis and Conclusions

There are three stages to understanding the Qurʾan: (a) tarjamah (translation), relating to the outward words and their meaning; (b) tafsīr, explaining the meanings of the verses; and (c) taʾwīl, about which three views have been presented. They are:

  1. The popular view, that some meanings of [particular Qurʾanic] words and/or the ultimate meaning sought is taʾwīl;
  2. Ibn ʿArabī’s view, that the hidden meaning that is bestowed by God Almighty is taʾwīl;
  3. ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s view, that Qurʾanic words and meanings are derived from reality and that reality is taʾwīl.

According to the popular view, taʾwīl is not related to the whole of the Qurʾan, but only to certain verses, namely, those that are ambiguous. According to Ibn ‘Arabi’s view taʾwīl is possible for the whole of the Qurʾan, regardless of whether they are ambiguous or clear verses. This is so because the whole of the Qurʾan has hidden meanings that are bestowed from God, the Most Exalted. According to ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī as well, taʾwīl of the Qurʾan belongs to the entire Qurʾan, because the reality of all verses exists independent of their words.

According to the popular view and that of ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī, knowledge of taʾwīl is with God and those firmly rooted in knowledge (i.e., Ahl al-Bayt). However, according to Ibn ‘Arabi, those rooted in knowledge are all gnostics, whether they are of Ahl al-Bayt or not.

According to the popular view and that of Ibn ‘Arabi, taʾwīl is related to Qurʾanic words and their meaning. However, according to ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī, taʾwīl is not related to words, but rather to reality and objective existence.

The meaning of the Qurʾanic verse, “nor is there a single grain in the darkness of the earth, or anything, fresh or withered, that is not written in a clear Book”[13]Qurʾan, al-Anʿām (6):59. is best understood if we accept ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s view. That is to say, in every age and era the reality of the words of the Holy Qurʾan can only be explained by Ahl al-Bayt. It is so because only these personalities are truly deserving of the title, “those who have knowledge of the Book.”[14]Qurʾan, al-Raʿd (13):43. Hence, in every age, Ahl al-Bayt are needed to understand the Qurʾan, regardless of whether the particular science in question regards legal rulings, wisdom, or exhortations. Only Ahl al-Bayt can explicate the Qurʾan’s true meaning and purpose, for only they fully know the reality of things.

 

Notes   [ + ]

1. Qurʾan, Āl ʿImrān (3):5.
2. Lisān al-ʿArab, s.v. “f-s-r.”
3. Tafsīr al-Mīzān, vol. 1 (Beirut: Muʾassasah al-Aʿlamī li-l-Maṭbūʿāt, 1390 S.H.), p.4.
4. Lisān al-ʿArab, s.v. “a-w-l.”
5. Qurʾan, Yūsuf (12):100.
6. Qurʾan, Āl ʿImrān (3):7.
7. Muḥyi al-Dīn ibn al-ʿArabī, “Maʿrifat al-Ishārāt,” in al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyyah, vol. 10 (n.p., n.d.), p. 279. See also, Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, Falsafat al-Taʾwīl (al-Markaz al-Thiqāfī al-ʿArabī, 2014), p. 267-8.
8. al-Mīzān, vol. 3, p. 49.
9. al-Mīzān, vol. 3, p. 46-7.
10. al-Mīzān, vol. 3, p. 23.
11. Qurʾan, al-Anʿām (6):59. “Not a grain in the earth’s shadows, not a thing, fresh or withered, but it is in a Book Manifest.
12. Comparable aḥādīth include the following hadith from Imam al-Bāqir (ʿa): “Only a liar will claim to have collected the entire Qurʾan as it was revealed [other than the Ahl al-Bayt.]  None have compiled, memorized, and preserved [the Qurʾan] exactly as Allah revealed except for ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib and the Imams after him.” (Al-Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, vol. 1 (Tehran: Dār al-Kutub al-Islāmiyyah, 1407), hadith #1, p. 228) And: “…only he who is addressed by the Qurʾan truly knows it.” (Al-Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, vol 8, hadith #485, p. 311.) For more such aḥādīth, see Muḥsin al-Fayḍ al-Kāshānī, “Towards the Sacred Text: The Importance and Value of the Qurʾan in the Life of a Believer,” translated by Azhar Sheraze.
13. Qurʾan, al-Anʿām (6):59.
14. Qurʾan, al-Raʿd (13):43.

Discovering the Unseen: An Interview on Istikhārah with Shaykh Muḥammad ʿAlī Girāmī

The following is an interview with Shaykh Muḥammad ʿAlī Girāmī Qummī, a well-regarded mujtahid and teacher of the Qumm seminary. Shaykh Girāmī has also become well-known in the past few decades for his inspired istikhārahs, which he regularly conducts in person and by telephone after the maghrib and ʿishāʾ prayers. Born in the year 1317 S.H. (1938 C.E.), he hails from a line of esteemed scholars; his grandfather, the late Shaykh Abu al-Qāsim Kabīr al-Qummī, was among the foremost scholars of Qumm who resided and taught in the city’s seminary even before the arrival of Shaykh Abd al-Karīm Hāʾīrī’s in the year 1301 S.H. (1922 C.E.). Shaykh Girāmī was a student of some of the foremost scholars of the 20th century, including Sayyid al-Burūjirdī, Imām al-Khumaynī, Sayyid Muḥaqqiq Dāmād, Shaykh Murtaḍā Hāʾirī Yazdī, and Shaykh Farīd Arākī.

The following interview was conducted at the end of 2016 by a French sociologist studying the various social and religious functions of the practice of istikhārah. In it, Shaykh Girāmī explores the nature of the istikhārah, a sanctioned means by which a believer consults God when facing a difficult or perplexing decision. Shaykh Girāmī explains the spiritual grounds of the istikhārah, the various methods of conducting it, and how a seeker should understand and approach it in terms of his decision-making process. The transcript was first published in the Persian-language monthly, Taqrīrāt, and is translated and reprinted here with permission. (Click here for the original Persian-language transcript.)


What is an istikhārah? Is it just a way of seeking the grace and blessings of God?

Istikhārah is of two types: the first is a prayer to attain something desired, which is the [literal meaning of istikhārah, namely] “seeking what is good,” from God. The second type is a means of consulting God, so that He may show us the path that leads to the preferred decision. This second type can be conducted either by means of the Qurʾan or a tasbīḥ (rosary). We have religious evidence that justifies both forms of istikhārah. We know that humans are quite frequently stuck at a crossroads, and must decide and choose how to act. If they are undecided after having reflected deeply and consulted others, they can seek an istikhārah. For example, one can do an istikhārah for a marriage prospect, for an important business transaction, or even for accepting an important responsibility. The istikhārah is a miracle of and a blessing from the Ahl al-Bayt for their Shiʿah during the occultation of the twelfth Imam, and allows them to make good decisions.

On what issues do people request you to conduct an istikhārah?

People will seek an istikhārah for all the various types of issues they may face, issues they cannot resolve or make a decision about on their own. And they see its beneficial results; why else would they continue to seek istikhārahs? I have even had a case where someone sought an istikhārah in a judicial matter, where the judge could not decide which way to rule, and he then turned to an istikhārah. After we conducted the istikhārah, and told him that he has misunderstood the facts of the case, he refrained from his issuing his judgment, went back, reviewed his notes, and saw that what the istikhārah had stated was correct. He was really elated. Afterward, he even came and told us the results of his findings. [Translator note: The istikhārah in this case was not with regard to the judgment itself, since istikhārah is not a valid basis for such a judgment, but rather for the judge’s confidence in his own diligence.]

Did the Prophet Muhammad and the Imams also seek istikhārahs?

Istikhārah is only meant to remove one’s doubt and indecision in a situation. The Prophet and the Imams had access to the wellspring of revelation, and they had access to the unseen (ghayb). They had no need for an istikhārah. They did, however, encourage their followers to seek it; we have numerous reports that the Imams would teach their followers when and how to do istikhārahs, through the Qurʾan, a tasbīḥ, or by other means. But we don’t have any evidence that the Imams would seek an istikhārah for themselves.

Some Christians, particular within the Orthodox churches, will use the Bible to seek an istikhārah. But why do Sunnis not utilize the Qurʾan in this way?

Sunnis have yet to fully benefit from the Qurʾan. They have not benefited fully from the Prophet himself. The Prophet had so many elite companions, but they source so many of their laws and sharʿī rulings in the words of Abu Ḥurayrah, who despite having only spent approximately a year and a half with the Prophet, narrated around 30,000 aḥādīth directly from him. It is even narrated of the second caliph that he severely castigated Abu Ḥurayrah for his extensive fabrication of hadith.

Yet nowadays, many Sunnis, both within Iran and abroad, have sought istikhārahs. A little while ago, a delegation of scholars from the region of Sistan visited and requested a number of them. Even some Christian priests from Tehran have requested istikhārahs.

Is there a preferred time for seeking an istikhārah?

Some say that one such preferred time is Friday afternoon after the midday prayers, among other reported times throughout the week. However, these types of reports seem to not be supported by any religious evidence. The correct view is that God is always listening; His door is always open. My own teacher, ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī, would tell me that he does not accept there to be a preferred time for istikhārahs, and neither do I.

What is the correct intention for seeking an istikhārah?

The person seeking an istikhārah, in his heart and mind, must be in a state of indecision. This is a sufficient prerequisite. He doesn’t need to explicitly state his intent.

What things should a person refrain from seeking an istikhārah for?

If we have consulted others, have not found any definitive intellectual or legislative decree, and are still truly confused about how to deal with a situation, we can seek an istikhārah.

Some Qurʾans indicate the response of the istikhārah, that is, a particular page is labelled as “good,” another “bad,” and another “in-between.” Why are these Qurʾans not used for seeking istikhārahs as frequently anymore?

The istikhārah is not like the other Islamic sciences, like fiqh and usul [al-fiqh], nor like medicine and philosophy; it is not a purely intellectual endeavor. The istikhārah is at its core a matter of spiritual emanation; that is, it is a spiritual connection to the unseen. When such a spiritual connection must be established, universal or automatic answers are void, as are definitive yes’s or no’s indicated at the top of a Qurʾanic page. First, all Qurʾanic verses are fundamentally good. Second, each situation has a particular emanation that is relevant to the verse that appears, a particular relationship that the verse may not have with other events. Some of the proof-texts for the istikhārah from our Imams state the following: ما وقع في قلبه, meaning that we must be attentive to what occurs to our heart. And such occurences are of course not uniform.

So do you consider it incorrect to use such Qurʾans?

Yes.

How can lay people conduct an istikhārah themselves? Can they conduct an istikhārah through the internet or telephone?

The command (by the Imams) to conduct an istikhārah is general, and applies to all. However, the only conclusive and determinative istikhārahs are those conducted by a person who has received an inner permission, whether in a dream or while awake. Even a very knowledgeable scholar may not have been ordained with such a permission. In fact, it is said that Shaykh ʿAbd al-Karīm Hāʾirī would not conduct istikhārahs through the Qurʾan, because he would say, “I don’t know nor understand istikhārahs conducted through the Qurʾan. For example, what should I think of a verse that states ‘[Prophet] Musa (ʿa) said…?’ Is it a positive or a negative sign?” He would, however, conduct istikhārahs for himself and others via the tasbīḥ. The istikhārah is really an example of that spiritual emanation, and requires one to have an inner connection and permission.

So are you saying that one should not conduct istikhārahs by internet or phone?

No. As I mentioned earlier, the istikhārah is a spiritual state that is rooted in one’s deeper connection with the unseen. We cannot expect just anyone to have such a connection.

Can ordinary people conduct istikhārahs through translated Qurʾans?

No. Nor can one even conduct an istikhārah via Arabic Qurʾans. Nor is it possible for just anyone to conduct. It really requires that spiritual connection with the unseen.

Is it required for a person to act according to the results of an istikhārah?

It is not mandatory; however it is abhorrent to go against the results. The person has sought to consult God; he should not then oppose His advice. In this regard, the istikhārah is akin to dream interpretation, for not anyone can interpret dreams correctly, nor does it require a certain level of scholarship. There was, in fact, an illiterate woman in Najaf who could interpret dreams. A scholar once asked her how she acquired this ability. She responded, “I was very poor and sought the intercession of Haḍrat ʿAbbās. I saw a dream where they told me to hold a tasbīḥ, and that they will tell me what to say in response to people’s dreams.” She used to say that someone would just whisper in her ear. Therefore, it really has no connection to knowledge or scholarship. It is really a connection to the unseen.

Is it correct for someone to seek multiple istikhārahs with a single intention?

It is not good to repeatedly seek (for the same decision). The first istikhārah is really the criteria (for decision-making).

Then why do so many people do this sort of repetitive istikhārahs?

They are mistaken. If I find out that a person has already sought an istikhārah for a single intention and issue, I will not conduct the istikhārah.

 Can you describe how you conduct istikhārahs?

It cannot really be explained. It is one form of connecting with God.

Is there a specific method of teaching or conducting istikhārahs among religious scholars?

Our narrations state various methods for conducting the istikhārah, some of which are mentioned in the Mafātīḥ [al-Jinān]. However, this is all just on the outer aspect of the matter. What is important is that inner spiritual connection, which a person may be inspired with in ways that differ from those mentioned in the texts. God can inspire a person in many different ways; He states in the Qurʾan that even the honeybee receives some form of revelation.

Is the istikhārah related to the science of Qurʾanic tafsīr?

To an extent, it is. Tafsīr functions as a necessary introduction to istikhārah; however the istikhārah is not merely a form of tafsīr. A single verse may result in one istikhārah and have a particular interpretation, which may be different from the interpretation of that same verse in another istikhārah. Because of how quickly the istikhārah takes place, some have said about me that I don’t even look at the words of the Qurʾan.

What is the difference between fortune-telling and an istikhārah?

Fortune-telling is really an attempt to prophesy the future. It does not help a person determine what he should do. An istikhārah, however, helps a person decide how to act. It is for a person who does not know which decision to make. In this respect, an istikhārah is like a doctor’s prescription. It is not good to use the Qurʾan to tell one’s fortune. We actually have narrations that proscribe such uses of the Qurʾan.

Do you also seek istikhārahs for your own decisions?

Yes, of course. Very often. For example, I conducted one this morning. I conduct istikhārahs for certain meetings.

Did you conduct an istikhārah for this interview?

I may have conducted an istikhārah for today’s interview.

The Qurʾanic Biography of Imam Husayn: A Translation of Sayyid al-ʿUlama’s “Husayn (ʿa) and the Qurʾan”

Sayyid ʿAlī Naqī Naqvī, popularly known as Sayyid al-ʿUlama, was widely considered to be the most prolific and influential mujtahid in the Indian subcontinent of the twentieth century. Originally from Lucknow, India, he hailed from a renowned family of scholars, called Khāndān-e Ijtihād of the Shiʿi Awadh state. He studied in Najaf for many years under the most prominent marājīʿ of his time, including Mirzā Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Nāʾīnī, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn al-ʿIrāqī, and Abu al-Ḥasan al-Isfahānī. He wrote prolifically and spoke widely on a number of key and pressing issues facing the Shiʿi community of the Indian subcontinent. He was also affiliated for many years with Aligarh University as a Reader and as the Dean of Shiʿi Theology.

In this short treatise, Sayyid al-ʿUlamāʾ gives a Qurʾanic biography of the Lord of Martyrs, Imam Ḥusayn (ʿa), and sheds light on the causes of the event of Karbala. In this brief but profound text, he provides an exegesis of the life of Imam Ḥusayn (ʿa) and his heroic martyrdom through particular verses that highlight the most pivotal aspects of the Imam’s life. Meant for a wider audience, the text strips down a lengthy discussion to its fundamentals so as to provide us a striking lesson: that the Imam is the Qurʾan embodied, a claim eminently provable by the following Qurʾanic verses themselves.

The treatise is translated by Dr. Syed Rizwan Zamir, associate professor of religion in Davidson College in Davidson, North Carolina. Dr. Zamir’s Ph.D. dissertation was on the religio-intellectual thought of Sayyid ʿAlī Naqvī and his profound influence on the religious and social landscape of the Shiʿi community in South Asia. The Qurʾanic translations are loosely based on Arberry’s translation of the Qurʾan. 


 

In the name of Allah, the most Merciful, the All-Compassionate.

 

SECTION I: A Synopsis of the Martyr of Karbalāʾ’s life as Given in the Qurʾan

The Imam's (ʿa) family:
إِنَّمَا يُرِيدُ اللَّـهُ لِيُذْهِبَ عَنكُمُ الرِّجْسَ أَهْلَ الْبَيْتِ وَيُطَهِّرَكُمْ تَطْهِيرًا
O People of the House, God only desires to put away from you all abomination and to cleanse you thoroughly.
Sūrat al-Aḥzāb (33):33

 

His birth:
وَوَصَّيْنَا الْإِنسَانَ بِوَالِدَيْهِ إِحْسَانًا ۖ حَمَلَتْهُ أُمُّهُ كُرْهًا وَوَضَعَتْهُ كُرْهًا ۖ وَحَمْلُهُ وَفِصَالُهُ ثَلَاثُونَ شَهْرًا ۚ حَتَّىٰ إِذَا بَلَغَ أَشُدَّهُ وَبَلَغَ أَرْبَعِينَ سَنَةً قَالَ رَبِّ أَوْزِعْنِي أَنْ أَشْكُرَ نِعْمَتَكَ الَّتِي أَنْعَمْتَ عَلَيَّ وَعَلَىٰ وَالِدَيَّ وَأَنْ أَعْمَلَ صَالِحًا تَرْضَاهُ وَأَصْلِحْ لِي فِي ذُرِّيَّتِي ۖ إِنِّي تُبْتُ إِلَيْكَ وَإِنِّي مِنَ الْمُسْلِمِينَ
We have charged man to be kind to his parents; his mother bore him painfully, and painfully she gave birth to him; his bearing and his weaning are thirty months. Until, when he is fully grown, and reaches forty years, he says, “O my Lord, grant me that I may be thankful for Thy blessing that Thou hast blessed me and my father and mother, and that I may do righteousness well-pleasing to Thee; and make me righteous also in my offspring. Behold, I repent to Thee, and am among those who surrender.”
Sūrat al-Aḥqāf (46):15

 

His ultimate objective:
لَا شَرِيكَ لَهُ ۖ وَبِذَٰلِكَ أُمِرْتُ وَأَنَا أَوَّلُ الْمُسْلِمِينَ

“No associate has He. Thus have I been commanded, and I am the first of those that surrender.”

Sūrat al-Anʿām (6):163

 

His journey from Medina:
فَخَرَجَ مِنْهَا خَائِفًا يَتَرَقَّبُ ۖ قَالَ رَبِّ نَجِّنِي مِنَ الْقَوْمِ الظَّالِمِينَ
So he departed therefrom, fearful and vigilant; he said, “My Lord, deliver me from the evil-doing people.”
Sūrat al-Qaṣaṣ (28):21

 

A minority facing a majority:

فَلَمَّا فَصَلَ طَالُوتُ بِالْجُنُودِ قَالَ إِنَّ اللَّـهَ مُبْتَلِيكُم بِنَهَرٍ فَمَن شَرِبَ مِنْهُ فَلَيْسَ مِنِّي وَمَن لَّمْ يَطْعَمْهُ فَإِنَّهُ مِنِّي إِلَّا مَنِ اغْتَرَفَ غُرْفَةً بِيَدِهِ ۚ فَشَرِبُوا مِنْهُ إِلَّا قَلِيلًا مِّنْهُمْ ۚ فَلَمَّا جَاوَزَهُ هُوَ وَالَّذِينَ آمَنُوا مَعَهُ قَالُوا لَا طَاقَةَ لَنَا الْيَوْمَ بِجَالُوتَ وَجُنُودِهِ ۚ قَالَ الَّذِينَ يَظُنُّونَ أَنَّهُم مُّلَاقُو اللَّـهِ كَم مِّن فِئَةٍ قَلِيلَةٍ غَلَبَتْ فِئَةً كَثِيرَةً بِإِذْنِ اللَّـهِ ۗ وَاللَّـهُ مَعَ الصَّابِرِينَ

And when Saul went forth with the hosts he said, “God will try you with a river; whoever drinks of it is not of me, and whoever tastes it not, he is of me, except him who scoops up with his hand.” But they drank of it, except a few of them; and when he crossed it along with those who believed with him, they said, “We have no power today against Goliath and his hosts.” Said those who reckoned they should meet God, “How often a little company has overcome a numerous company, by God’s leave! And God is with the patient.”

Sūrat al-Baqarah (2):249

 

A loyal contingent and final farewells:
مِّنَ الْمُؤْمِنِينَ رِجَالٌ صَدَقُوا مَا عَاهَدُوا اللَّـهَ عَلَيْهِ ۖ فَمِنْهُم مَّن قَضَىٰ نَحْبَهُ وَمِنْهُم مَّن يَنتَظِرُ ۖ وَمَا بَدَّلُوا تَبْدِيلًا
Among the believers are men who were true to their covenant with God; some of them have fulfilled their vow by death, and some are still awaiting, and they have not changed in the least.
Sūrat al-Aḥzāb (33):23
[1]In this section, the original Urdu text isn’t clear, and seems to refer to the farewells between the various followers of Imam Husayn who comprise that loyal contingent.
Final words of advice:
إِلَّا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا وَعَمِلُوا الصَّالِحَاتِ وَتَوَاصَوْا بِالْحَقِّ وَتَوَاصَوْا بِالصَّبْرِ
Save those who believe, and do righteous deeds, and counsel each other unto the truth, and counsel each other to be steadfast.
Sūrat al-ʿAṣr (103):3

 

The greatness of patience:
الَّذِينَ إِذَا أَصَابَتْهُم مُّصِيبَةٌ قَالُوا إِنَّا لِلَّـهِ وَإِنَّا إِلَيْهِ رَاجِعُونَ
Who, when they are visited by an affliction, say, “Surely we belong to God, and to Him we return…”

Sūrat al-Baqarah (2):156

 

His final end:
يَا أَيَّتُهَا النَّفْسُ الْمُطْمَئِنَّةُ ﴿٢٧﴾ ارْجِعِي إِلَىٰ رَبِّكِ رَاضِيَةً مَّرْضِيَّةً ﴿٢٨﴾ فَادْخُلِي فِي عِبَادِي ﴿٢٩﴾ وَادْخُلِي جَنَّتِي ﴿٣٠
(27) “O soul at peace, (28) return unto thy Lord, well-pleased, well-pleasing! (29) Enter thou among My servants! (30) Enter thou My Paradise!”
Sūrat al-Fajr (89):27-30

 

His eternal life:
الَّذِينَ يَقُولُونَ رَبَّنَا إِنَّنَا آمَنَّا فَاغْفِرْ لَنَا ذُنُوبَنَا وَقِنَا عَذَابَ النَّارِ
Who say, “Our Lord, we believe; forgive us our sins, and guard us against the torment of the Fire…”
Sūrat Āl ʿImrān (3):16

Section II: Causes and Reasons of Imam Husayn’s Heroic Acts as Given in God’s Words (i.e., the Qurʾan)

 

Abraham's (ʿa) prayer,
that there be true guardians of Islam from his progeny:
وَإِذْ يَرْفَعُ إِبْرَاهِيمُ الْقَوَاعِدَ مِنَ الْبَيْتِ وَإِسْمَاعِيلُ رَبَّنَا تَقَبَّلْ مِنَّا ۖ إِنَّكَ أَنتَ السَّمِيعُ الْعَلِيمُ ﴿١٢٧﴾ رَبَّنَا وَاجْعَلْنَا مُسْلِمَيْنِ لَكَ وَمِن ذُرِّيَّتِنَا أُمَّةً مُّسْلِمَةً لَّكَ وَأَرِنَا مَنَاسِكَنَا وَتُبْ عَلَيْنَا ۖ إِنَّكَ أَنتَ التَّوَّابُ الرَّحِيمُ ﴿١٢٨﴾
(127) And when Abraham, and Ishmael with him, raised up the foundations of the House: “Our Lord, accept this from us; Thou art the All-hearing, the All-knowing; (128) and, our Lord, make us submissive to Thee, and of our seed a nation submissive to Thee; and show us our holy rites, and turn towards us; surely Thou turnest, and art All-compassionate…”
Sūrat al-Baqarah (2):127-128

 

Abraham’s (ʿa) last will and testament to his children,
that they remain guardians of Islam:
وَوَصَّىٰ بِهَا إِبْرَاهِيمُ بَنِيهِ وَيَعْقُوبُ يَا بَنِيَّ إِنَّ اللَّـهَ اصْطَفَىٰ لَكُمُ الدِّينَ فَلَا تَمُوتُنَّ إِلَّا وَأَنتُم مُّسْلِمُونَ
And Abraham charged his sons with this and Jacob likewise: “My sons, God has chosen for you the religion; see that you die not save in surrender.”
Sūrat al-Baqarah (2):127-128

 

The greatest fulfilment of Abraham’s (ʿa) prayer,
is the chosen messenger, Muhammad (ṣ), his progeny, and his true followers:
إِنَّ أَوْلَى النَّاسِ بِإِبْرَاهِيمَ لَلَّذِينَ اتَّبَعُوهُ وَهَـٰذَا النَّبِيُّ وَالَّذِينَ آمَنُوا ۗ وَاللَّـهُ وَلِيُّ الْمُؤْمِنِينَ
Surely the people standing closest to Abraham are those who followed him, and this Prophet, and those who believe; and God is the Protector of the believers.
Sūrat Āl ʿImrān (3):68

 

After the Prophet of Islam,
it was certain that the larger ummah will deviate from the right path:
وَمَا مُحَمَّدٌ إِلَّا رَسُولٌ قَدْ خَلَتْ مِن قَبْلِهِ الرُّسُلُ ۚ أَفَإِن مَّاتَ أَوْ قُتِلَ انقَلَبْتُمْ عَلَىٰ أَعْقَابِكُمْ ۚ وَمَن يَنقَلِبْ عَلَىٰ عَقِبَيْهِ فَلَن يَضُرَّ اللَّـهَ شَيْئًا ۗ وَسَيَجْزِي اللَّـهُ الشَّاكِرِينَ
Muhammad is but a Messenger; Messengers have passed away before him. If he should die or is slain, will you turn back on your heels? If any man should turn back on his heels, he will not harm God in any way; and God will recompense the thankful.
Sūrat Āl ʿImrān (3):144

 

The Muslims, after gaining power,
did corruption on earth and broke the bonds of love and intimacy:     
فَهَلْ عَسَيْتُمْ إِن تَوَلَّيْتُمْ أَن تُفْسِدُوا فِي الْأَرْضِ وَتُقَطِّعُوا أَرْحَامَكُمْ
If you turned away, would you then perchance work corruption in the land, and break your bonds of kinship?
Sūrat Muḥammad (47):22

 

Special group to enjoin good.
It is necessary for there to exist a certain group that will exhort people toward goodness and—to the extent possible—forbid evils.
وَلْتَكُن مِّنكُمْ أُمَّةٌ يَدْعُونَ إِلَى الْخَيْرِ وَيَأْمُرُونَ بِالْمَعْرُوفِ وَيَنْهَوْنَ عَنِ الْمُنكَرِ ۚ وَأُولَـٰئِكَ هُمُ الْمُفْلِحُونَ
Let there be a people among you, calling to good, and bidding to honor, and forbidding dishonor; those are the successful.
Sūrat Āl ʿImrān (3):104

 

Strive to oppose evil.
It is such a group whose raison d'etre is precisely to keep striving to oppose these evils: 
وَلِلَّـهِ مَا فِي السَّمَاوَاتِ وَمَا فِي الْأَرْضِ ۚ وَإِلَى اللَّـهِ تُرْجَعُ الْأُمُورُ
To God belongs all that is in the heavens and in the earth, and unto Him all matters are returned.
Sūrat Āl ʿImrān (3):109

 

This group should never obey those who deny God:
يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا إِن تُطِيعُوا الَّذِينَ كَفَرُوا يَرُدُّوكُمْ عَلَىٰ أَعْقَابِكُمْ فَتَنقَلِبُوا خَاسِرِينَ
O believers, if you obey the unbelievers they will turn you upon your heels, and you will turn back in a state of loss.
Sūrat Āl ʿImrān (3):149

 

One should stay firm on the straight path,
and one should not form bonds with oppressors:
وَلَا تَرْكَنُوا إِلَى الَّذِينَ ظَلَمُوا فَتَمَسَّكُمُ النَّارُ وَمَا لَكُم مِّن دُونِ اللَّـهِ مِنْ أَوْلِيَاءَ ثُمَّ لَا تُنصَرُونَ
And rely not on the evildoers, so that the Fire touches you—you have no protectors apart from God—and then you will not be helped.
Sūrat Hūd (11):113

 

They are appointed to always obey God,
the Most Exalted, and no one else:
وَمَا أُمِرُوا إِلَّا لِيَعْبُدُوا اللَّـهَ مُخْلِصِينَ لَهُ الدِّينَ حُنَفَاءَ وَيُقِيمُوا الصَّلَاةَ وَيُؤْتُوا الزَّكَاةَ ۚ وَذَٰلِكَ دِينُ الْقَيِّمَةِ
They were commanded only to serve God, devoting themselves to Him, men of pure faith, and to perform the prayer, and pay the alms—that is the religion of the True.
Sūrat al-Bayyinah (98):5

 

Mandatory Migration.
If it is not possible to perform one’s duties, one has to abandon one’s homeland:
إِنَّ الَّذِينَ تَوَفَّاهُمُ الْمَلَائِكَةُ ظَالِمِي أَنفُسِهِمْ قَالُوا فِيمَ كُنتُمْ ۖ قَالُوا كُنَّا مُسْتَضْعَفِينَ فِي الْأَرْضِ ۚ قَالُوا أَلَمْ تَكُنْ أَرْضُ اللَّـهِ وَاسِعَةً فَتُهَاجِرُوا فِيهَا ۚ فَأُولَـٰئِكَ مَأْوَاهُمْ جَهَنَّمُ ۖ وَسَاءَتْ مَصِيرًا
And those the angels take, while still they are wronging themselves—the angels will say, “In what circumstances were you?” They will say, “We were abased in the earth.” The angels will say, “But was not God’s earth wide, so that you might have emigrated in it?” Such men, their refuge shall be Hell—an evil abode!
Sūrat al-Nisāʾ (4):97

 

One should refuse obedience to anyone other than God,
and in consequence one should not be anxious about loss of home or even death:
كُلُّ نَفْسٍ ذَائِقَةُ الْمَوْتِ ۖ ثُمَّ إِلَيْنَا تُرْجَعُونَ
Every soul shall taste of death; then unto Us you shall be returned.
Sūrat al-ʿAnkabūt (29):57

 

If necessary, one should stand up and fight:
أُذِنَ لِلَّذِينَ يُقَاتَلُونَ بِأَنَّهُمْ ظُلِمُوا ۚ وَإِنَّ اللَّـهَ عَلَىٰ نَصْرِهِمْ لَقَدِيرٌ ﴿٣٩﴾ الَّذِينَ أُخْرِجُوا مِن دِيَارِهِم بِغَيْرِ حَقٍّ إِلَّا أَن يَقُولُوا رَبُّنَا اللَّـهُ ۗ وَلَوْلَا دَفْعُ اللَّـهِ النَّاسَ بَعْضَهُم بِبَعْضٍ لَّهُدِّمَتْ صَوَامِعُ وَبِيَعٌ وَصَلَوَاتٌ وَمَسَاجِدُ يُذْكَرُ فِيهَا اسْمُ اللَّـهِ كَثِيرًا ۗ وَلَيَنصُرَنَّ اللَّـهُ مَن يَنصُرُهُ ۗ إِنَّ اللَّـهَ لَقَوِيٌّ عَزِيزٌ ﴿٤٠﴾ الَّذِينَ إِن مَّكَّنَّاهُمْ فِي الْأَرْضِ أَقَامُوا الصَّلَاةَ وَآتَوُا الزَّكَاةَ وَأَمَرُوا بِالْمَعْرُوفِ وَنَهَوْا عَنِ الْمُنكَرِ ۗ وَلِلَّـهِ عَاقِبَةُ الْأُمُورِ ﴿٤١﴾
(39) Permission is given to those who fight because they were wronged—surely God is able to help them – (40) who were expelled from their homes without cause, except that they say “Our Lord is God.” Had God not driven back the people, some by the means of others, there would have been destroyed cloisters and churches, oratories and mosques, wherein God’s Name is much mentioned. Assuredly God will help him who helps Him—surely God is All-strong, All-mighty (41) who, if We establish them in the land, perform the prayer, and pay the alms, and bid to honor, and forbid dishonor; and unto God belongs the issue of all affairs.
Sūrat al-Ḥajj (22):39-41

 

Even if killed, God’s Will is more precious than the blessings of this world:
يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا لَا تَكُونُوا كَالَّذِينَ كَفَرُوا وَقَالُوا لِإِخْوَانِهِمْ إِذَا ضَرَبُوا فِي الْأَرْضِ أَوْ كَانُوا غُزًّى لَّوْ كَانُوا عِندَنَا مَا مَاتُوا وَمَا قُتِلُوا لِيَجْعَلَ اللَّـهُ ذَٰلِكَ حَسْرَةً فِي قُلُوبِهِمْ ۗ وَاللَّـهُ يُحْيِي وَيُمِيتُ ۗ وَاللَّـهُ بِمَا تَعْمَلُونَ بَصِيرٌ
O believers, be not as the unbelievers who say to their brothers, when they journey in the land, or are upon expeditions, “If they had been with us, they would not have died or been slain”—that God may make that an anguish in their hearts. For God gives life, and He makes to die; and God sees the things that you do.
Sūrat Āl ʿImrān (3):156

 

In the end, victory is for the folks of God:
كَتَبَ اللَّـهُ لَأَغْلِبَنَّ أَنَا وَرُسُلِي ۚ إِنَّ اللَّـهَ قَوِيٌّ عَزِيزٌ
God has written, “I shall assuredly be victorious, I and My Messengers.” Surely God is All-strong, All-mighty.
Sūrat al-Mujādalah (58):21

Notes   [ + ]

1. In this section, the original Urdu text isn’t clear, and seems to refer to the farewells between the various followers of Imam Husayn who comprise that loyal contingent.

Tadwīn al-Ḥadīth: The Prohibition of Hadith & the Prophetic Legacy

The following is the second installment of Sayyid Aḥmad al-Madadī’s lecture series regarding the circulation of hadith. The first article dealt with explaining the difference between sunnah and hadith and with the origin of Arabic writing. This section discusses the disagreement between Sunni scholarship on the original permissibility of writing other than the Qurʾan and the evidence of the various perspectives. Finally, Sayyid al-Madadī briefly explains the Shiʿi rejection of a prohibition of writing ever coming from the Prophet (ṣ).

The history of hadith circulation cannot be studied without surveying the stances of the majority of Muslim scholars and historians. Sunni researchers have been divided on whether or not writing down hadith was even permissible. This is due to a variety of conflicting reports floating around the intellectual circles of the early Muslims. Scholars were forced to critically engage with this conflicting material in order to extract what they thought was the authentic teaching of the Prophet (ṣ) with regards to his sunnah.

The prevailing opinion in the Sunni world has been that the Prophet (ṣ) prohibited the recording of his hadith and that this prohibition continued after him for some time. Sunni scholars, however, differ regarding the degree of this prohibition. Indeed, this dispute can be traced back to the time of the Companions (ṣaḥābah) and Successors (tābiʿūn). We see that although the view of the majority of scholars in the early period was that writing prophetic hadith was forbidden, there were early proponents of recording and circulating hadith. For example, some early Muslims believed it was permissible to write hadith so that it could be memorized, but one must erase the writing thereafter.

Many aspects of this issue—for example, whether hadith writing is permissible, the origins of a possible prohibition, the reasons—are all subjects of debate among scholars and researchers to this very day. For example, Dr. Ṣubḥī Ṣāliḥ argues that the writing of hadith was, in fact, not prohibited, and that the circulation of hadith was permitted by the Prophet (ṣ) himself—an opinion that stands notably in opposition to the majority. Another researcher, Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā, supports the view that the writing and circulation of hadith was prohibited.

The most important piece of evidence used in this regard is the hadith of Abū Saʿīd al-Khudrī, as narrated in Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim:

لَا تَكْتُبُوا عَنِّي شَيْئًا إِلَّا الْقُرْآنَ ، فَمَنْ كَتَبَ عَنِّي شَيْئًا غَيْرَ الْقُرْآنِ ، فَلْيَمْحُهُ.

“Do not record anything from me except the Qurʾan. Whoever has recorded anything from me other than the Qurʾan, let him efface it.”

Although other reports are also used as evidence for this prohibition, none are as important as this hadith because of its supposed reliability—after all, it is cited in Muslim’s Ṣaḥīḥ. Note that al-Bukhārī did not include this report in his Ṣaḥīḥ, because according to him—and others—this report is not marfūʿ. Rather, it is mawqūf.[1]In Sunni hadith-chain evaluation (ʿilm al-dirāyah), a report that is traced back to the Prophet (ṣ) is termed marfūʿ while a report that is traced back to a Companion is termed mawqūf. The term marfūʿ in Shiʿi hadith literature is used to denote an incomplete chain of transmission where a later narrator quotes a source—usually an Imam—with a clear generational gap between them. What they mean is that this report gives us the words and opinion of Abū Saʿīd himself, and not the Prophet (ṣ).

Although we can take issue with the provenance of this narration, if, for the sake of argument, we assume they are the words of the Prophet (ṣ), there still remains a reasonable alternative explanation for this hadith. The report appears to allude to the issue of mixing up the text of the Qurʾan with its commentary and interpretation. In that case, this hadith would pertain to the early days of the prophetic mission, when the Qurʾan was not as well-known or widely memorized as it was near the end of the Prophet’s (ṣ) life. This injunction would have been to prevent the mixing of the actual Qurʾanic verse with what the Prophet (ṣ) may have stated along with the verse, even though that interpretation (taʾwīl)—sourced in Allah’s Messenger (ṣ)—was itself a type of revelation (waḥy). The Companions would also record the verses of the Qurʾan along with their historical circumstances of revelation (asbāb al-nuzūl), exegesis (tafsīr), etc. You can see these types of narrations in tafsīr literature. For example, after “the straight path,” you may see “the path of ʿAlī.” This is not some sort of interpolation of the text; rather the Imam (ʿa) is here explaining an additional meaning—whether esoteric or exoteric—along with the formal Qurʾanic verse.

The early Muslims were very particular about not mixing any other material with the text of the Qurʾan. The Kufic script did not even have grammatical declension (iʿrāb), or dots (niqāt, sing. nuqtah). Per tradition,[2]Muslim tradition states that the foundations of the Arabic language were established by Abū al-Aswad al-Duʾalī on the instruction of Imam ʿAlī (ʿa). The sunni historian al-Dhahabī mentions the following: Abū ʿUbaydah said: Abū al-Aswad learned the foundations of Arabic language from ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib. Abū al-Aswad heard someone incorrectly recite the third verse of Sūrat al-Tawbah: “that Allah has forsaken the polytheists and so has His Messenger” as “…and (forsaken) His messenger.” And Abū al-Aswad said, “I did not think that the situation of society had come to this.” So Abū al-Aswad said to Ziyād, the governor, “Procure for me an intelligent scribe,” and one was provided. Abū al-Aswad said to his scribe, “When you see that I have vowelized a letter with an ‘a’ sound, write a dot above that letter, a letter with an ‘u’ sound, write a dot in front of that letter, a letter with an ‘i’ sound, write a dot under that letter. When I follow up any of these vowels with a ghunnah, then instead of one dot put two dots.” These were the dots of Abū al-Aswad al-Duʾalī (Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Dhahabī, Siyar Aʿlām al-Nubalāʾ, vol. 4, “Min man adraka zamān al-nubuwwah” (Beirut: Muʾassassah al-Risālah, 1982), p. 83) Abū Aswad al-Duʾalī[3]His full name was Ẓālim b. ʿAmr, a successor (tābiʿī) whose life spanned the Era of Ignorance and Islam (termed in Sunni biographical works as a mukhaḍram), and who died at the age of eighty-five in the sixty-ninth year after the hijrah. He accepted Islam during the life of the Prophet (ṣ), and fought with Amīr al-Muʾminīn Imam ʿAlī in the Battle of the Camel (Jamal). (al-Dhahabī, Siyar Aʿlām al-Nubalāʾ, vol. 4, 82.) added them later, and the Muslims maintained that these dots cannot be written in the same script of the Qurʾan. Thus, they would, for example, write the text of the Qurʾan in black ink, but mark the vowels in red. This even led to a legal question: Do these vowels and other markings have the same ruling as the Qurʾan itself, namely that they are impermissible to touch outside a state of ritual purity (ṭahārah)?

This seems to be the context for the hadith of Abū Saʿīd; it is as if the Prophet (ṣ) had said, “If you want to write the Qurʾan, then do not add its explanation (taʾwīl).” This is a reasonable understanding of the hadith, and if true, the hadith does not proscribe the writing of the sunnah or hadith; rather, it is only calling to preserve the Qurʾan properly.

If we look at the large volumes of hadith literature comprising thousands of narrations, all compiled in the centuries following the prophetic era, none of the Muslims confused these with, or mistook them for the Qurʾan. Thus, it is not tenable that the Prophet (ṣ) forbade writing all else to protect the Qurʾan from interpolation.

Thus, it is not tenable that the Prophet (ṣ) forbade writing all else to protect the Qurʾan from interpolation.

Other evidence supports this view, as well.

Historians and biographers of the Prophet unanimously agree that following the hijrah, when the Prophet (ṣ) entered Medina, he ordered that a legal agreement be written between the Muslims and the Jews in which approximately fifty-two rules were codified. In the famous incident known as the “Calamity of Thursday” (raziyyat al-khamīs), there is also a consensus that the Prophet (ṣ) requested pen and paper in order to write something for the guidance of Muslims:

ائتوني بالكتف والدواة—أو اللوح والدواة—أكتب لكم كتاباً لن تضلوا بعده أبداً

Bring me a shoulder blade and ink-pot (or a tablet and ink-pot) so that I may write for you a document, following which you will never go astray.

Other such evidence can also be marshaled. The Prophet (ṣ) wrote to various individuals, such as certain poets and delegations. After the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah and the conquest of Mecca, delegations would come to meet the Prophet (ṣ). After they returned to their homes, he would write to them. The contents of some of these letters survive today in manuscript form, often called makātīb al-Rasūl.

After the Prophet (ṣ), Imam ʿAlī (ʿa) categorically allowed writing prophetic hadith. Although Sunni evidence for this conclusion is not as explicit as that of the Shīʿah, it is generally accepted that he and Imam Ḥasan (ʿa) allowed writing sunan and hadith. Despite this, Maḥmūd Abu Riyah counts Imam ʿAlī among those companions who forbade circulation, and al-Ṭabarī included ʿUmar among those who permitted it. It is without doubt that Imam ʿAlī permitted and ʿUmar forbade it; Maḥmūd Abu Riyah and al-Tabarī erred in their attributions. If such an obvious error can be made regarding the heads of each side of this conflict, we can only imagine what other errors exist in the opinions attributed to lesser figures.

After the conquest of Mecca, the Prophet (ṣ) stood amongst the people and delivered a sermon, after which a man by the name Abū Shāh arose and said:

اكْتُبُوا لِي يَا رَسُولَ اللَّهِ ، فَقَالَ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ: اكْتُبُوا لِأَبِي شَاهٍ ، قَالَ الْوَلِيدُ : فَقُلْتُ لِلْأَوْزَاعِيِّ : مَا قَوْلُهُ : اكْتُبُوا لِي يَا رَسُولَ اللَّهِ ؟ قَالَ: هَذِهِ الْخُطْبَةَ الَّتِي سَمِعَهَا مِنْ رَسُولِ اللَّهِ

“Write for me, oh Messenger of God.” The Prophet (ṣ) then said, “Write for Abū Shāh.” Walīd said: “I asked al-Awzāʿī what he meant by ‘Write for me, Messenger of God?’” He said, “He meant the sermon that he heard from the Prophet (ṣ).”

In a report, Abū Hurayrah states:

ما من أصحاب النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم أحد أكثر حديثا عنه مني إلا ما كان من عبد الله بن عمرو فإنه كان يكتب ولا أكتب

“None of the Prophet’s (ṣ) companions exceed me in narrating his (the Prophet’s) hadith except ʿAbdullāh b. ʿAmr, for he would write while I would not.”

It was well known that ʿAbdullāh b. ʿAmr b. al-ʿĀṣ wrote down hadith. ʿAbdullāh himself seems to have had doubts whether writing the hadith of the Prophet was permissible. Sunnis narrate from ʿAbdullāh:

قُلْتُ: يَا رَسُولَ اللَّهِ إِنَّا لَنَسْمَعُ مِنْكَ أَشْيَاءَ نُحِبُّ أَنْ نَحْفَظَهَا أَوَنَكْتُبُهَا ؟ قَالَ: نَعَمْ. فَقُلْتُ: مَا يَكُونُ فِي الْغَضَبِ وَالرِّضَا؟ فَقَالَ: نَعَمْ فَإِنِّي لا أَقُولُ فِي الْغَضَبِ وَالرِّضَا إِلا حَقًّا.

I said, “Messenger of God, we hear from you many things, hoping to preserve them. Shall we write them?” The Prophet (ṣ), “Yes.” Then I said, “[Write even] what [you say] in anger and in joy?” He said, “Yes, for I do not say in anger or joy anything but truth.”

There is a wealth of evidence that the Prophet gave explicit permission to write hadith, some reports of which are transmitted by reliable means. However, these reports are not in the two Ṣaḥīḥ texts of al-Bukhārī and Muslim. This variation and apparent contradiction of evidence is what has led Sunni researchers to disagree over the question of permissibility of writing prophetic precedent. That is, their dispute relates to which set of narrations should be preferred and how the conflicting reports are to be reconciled. One group, mostly consisting of hadith scholars (muḥaddithūn), believes the Prophet (ṣ) allowed the writing of hadith as a dispensation. However, all Sunni scholars concede, as a matter of consensus, that the recording of hadith was permissible after the second generation (tābiʿ al-tābiʿīn), about 120 A.H. Some of their scholars explained that it became permissible as a necessity. The strongest evidence of this shift in view is the large corpus of hadith inherited from those generations until today. It became a sort of de facto consensus (ijmāʿ); everyone was writing hadith seeing as it was necessary to preserve the sunnah.

From the Shiʿi point of view, it is difficult to even imagine the Prophet (ṣ) prohibiting the writing of his sunnah or hadith. We have Qurʾanic verses (āyāt) and historical evidence that dismiss this as a possibility. Indeed, to forbid writing hadith would be tantamount to a call for the destruction of knowledge. It is inconceivable for the intricacies of religion to remain without writing, and against the practice of reasonable people (al-sīrah al-ʿuqalāʾiyyah).[4]The sīrah ʿuqalāʾiyyah is an indicator of legal evidence as established in the science of juristic principles (ʿilm uṣūl al-fiqh) whereby the existence of a standing practice of reasonable people—whether they are Muslim or not—is known to be concurrent with the infallible while there is no evidence or sufficient evidence of the infallible rejecting that sīrah establishes the affirmation of that sīrah by the infallible. Sayyid al-Madadī may be mentioning this principle here because after establishing the recording of teachings in writing as the practice of reasonable people, sparse and conflicting evidence is insufficient to affirm the infallible’s rejection. With the lack of rejection established, affirmation of the sīrah is proven. The Islamic tradition provides definitive evidence to the centrality of the prophetic legacy. The Book of Allah tells us that we find in the Prophet a beautiful example, and that whatever he gives to us we are to take. It is unconscionable for the man whose character is the Qurʾan personified not to allow the recording of his sunnah. Such a prohibition would be especially egregious when we consider that: 1) among the first pieces of revelation, he recited how Allah taught with the pen; 2) upon entering Medina after the hijrah, he wrote a canon of law between the Muslims and the Jews; 3) in his final days, he asked for pen and paper to guide the Muslims after his death.

The Prophet (ṣ) was establishing a religion for all. If he wanted that path to spread and for its teachings to be available to all, it had to be been written.

The Prophet (ṣ) was establishing a religion for all. If he wanted that path to spread and for its teachings to be available to all, it had to be been written.

It is not reasonable to obligate emulating the sunnah, then prevent it from being written. This would mean that only the residents of Medina would have access to it, and that it would remain in their memory alone. Thus, the entire Muslim polity (ummah) would have to leave it all in the hands of a small group and their memories, hence negating the Prophet’s (ṣ) own objectives.

Now, it can be argued that the prophetic precedents and hadith were not written during his lifetime. That is, however, an entirely different issue. The idea that the Prophet (ṣ) prohibited his ummah from writing them at all is categorically untenable. As discussed previously, he may have prohibited the writing of explanations of revelation together with the Qurʾan to prevent confusion between the Qurʾan proper and its exegesis. There was, without a doubt, no confusion among the Muslims about which texts were Qurʾanic and which are of the prophetic hadith. The words of Allah have a special flavor and eloquence to them, a quality that cannot be matched by human speech. There is an exceptional report with strong chains of transmission, found in both Shiʿi and Sunni sources, of an alleged verse of “stoning.” The phrasing of the purported verse, however, is not at all Qurʾanic. No matter the situation, the Qurʾan is always distinct from any other text. There was also never a discussion of writing Qurʾan and sunnah together, anyway. It has always been possible to easily record them separately.

In summary, the Sunni researchers have been divided on the issue of writing of hadith and remain divided up to this day, even if everyone has acquiesced to the pragmatic necessity of the matter. The school of Ahl al-Bayt (ʿa) unanimously holds that no such prohibition came from the Prophet (ṣ), and in fact such a proscription would be inconceivable from the person of the Messenger as presented in the Qurʾan and the sunnah transmitted by the Imams of his Household (ʿa).

Sayyid Aḥmad al-Madadī is a highly respected jurist and teacher in the holy city of Qumm. His teachers include the late Sayyid Abū l-Qāsim al-Khūʾī, and the current marjiʿ, Sayyid ʿAlī al-Sīstānī. He teaches baḥth al-khārij courses in fiqh and uṣūl al-fiqh, and has pioneered a new approach to hadith through bibliographical literature, called al-baḥth al-fihristī.

This transcript was prepared and translated by Haziq Sheikh of the Ahl al-Bayt Islamic Seminary.

Notes   [ + ]

1. In Sunni hadith-chain evaluation (ʿilm al-dirāyah), a report that is traced back to the Prophet (ṣ) is termed marfūʿ while a report that is traced back to a Companion is termed mawqūf. The term marfūʿ in Shiʿi hadith literature is used to denote an incomplete chain of transmission where a later narrator quotes a source—usually an Imam—with a clear generational gap between them.
2. Muslim tradition states that the foundations of the Arabic language were established by Abū al-Aswad al-Duʾalī on the instruction of Imam ʿAlī (ʿa). The sunni historian al-Dhahabī mentions the following: Abū ʿUbaydah said: Abū al-Aswad learned the foundations of Arabic language from ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib. Abū al-Aswad heard someone incorrectly recite the third verse of Sūrat al-Tawbah: “that Allah has forsaken the polytheists and so has His Messenger” as “…and (forsaken) His messenger.” And Abū al-Aswad said, “I did not think that the situation of society had come to this.” So Abū al-Aswad said to Ziyād, the governor, “Procure for me an intelligent scribe,” and one was provided. Abū al-Aswad said to his scribe, “When you see that I have vowelized a letter with an ‘a’ sound, write a dot above that letter, a letter with an ‘u’ sound, write a dot in front of that letter, a letter with an ‘i’ sound, write a dot under that letter. When I follow up any of these vowels with a ghunnah, then instead of one dot put two dots.” These were the dots of Abū al-Aswad al-Duʾalī (Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Dhahabī, Siyar Aʿlām al-Nubalāʾ, vol. 4, “Min man adraka zamān al-nubuwwah” (Beirut: Muʾassassah al-Risālah, 1982), p. 83)
3. His full name was Ẓālim b. ʿAmr, a successor (tābiʿī) whose life spanned the Era of Ignorance and Islam (termed in Sunni biographical works as a mukhaḍram), and who died at the age of eighty-five in the sixty-ninth year after the hijrah. He accepted Islam during the life of the Prophet (ṣ), and fought with Amīr al-Muʾminīn Imam ʿAlī in the Battle of the Camel (Jamal). (al-Dhahabī, Siyar Aʿlām al-Nubalāʾ, vol. 4, 82.)
4. The sīrah ʿuqalāʾiyyah is an indicator of legal evidence as established in the science of juristic principles (ʿilm uṣūl al-fiqh) whereby the existence of a standing practice of reasonable people—whether they are Muslim or not—is known to be concurrent with the infallible while there is no evidence or sufficient evidence of the infallible rejecting that sīrah establishes the affirmation of that sīrah by the infallible. Sayyid al-Madadī may be mentioning this principle here because after establishing the recording of teachings in writing as the practice of reasonable people, sparse and conflicting evidence is insufficient to affirm the infallible’s rejection. With the lack of rejection established, affirmation of the sīrah is proven.

Understanding Sacred Speech: An Interview with Shaykh Rizwan Arastu

How do we begin to approach the words of our Imams, who lived in worlds vastly different from ours today? How do we translate their sacred wisdom and teaching into an idiom that we can appreciate and apply? And how can we use their teachings as a bridge in our attempt to approach the sacred words of the Qurʾan? The following is an interview where we ask these questions and more of Shaykh Rizwan Arastu. 

Shaykh Rizwan Arastu is a graduate of the Islamic Seminary of Qumm, Iran, where he specialized in the study of the Qurʾan and hadith. Prior to the seminary, he received his bachelor’s degree in ecology and evolutionary biology along with minors in near eastern studies and education from Princeton University.

Shaykh Rizwan is the founding director of the Islamic Texts Institute, a non-profit research institute aimed at making Islamic sources available to the West with scholarly commentary. He is the founder of Islamic Literacy, and he is a member of the faculty at the Ahl al-Bayt Islamic Seminary.

Shaykh Rizwan resides with his wife and five children in Elgin, IL, just outside Chicago.


Al-Sidrah: You have begun the difficult task of translating one of the earliest Shiʿi hadith compilations of al-Kāfī. Please describe for us your work and goals.

RA: There are 2 volumes of al-Kāfī out, and a third, God and His Oneness, is at press. These are the first 3 books of al-Kāfī by Shaykh al-Kulaynī. The effort of the Islamic Texts Institute has been to make this collection of traditions accessible to non-specialists through excellent translation and original commentary, aimed at clarifying each tradition and situating it in the larger body of Islamic teachings.

Al-Sidrah: It must be quite difficult to choose a specific part of a key term’s semantic range to emphasize when translating. For example, you translated jahl as foolishness, which may not be the word that immediately comes to mind for some people. Why foolishness as opposed to the more common translation of ignorance?

RA: To understand and translate the terms ʿaql and jahl, we went through quite an intensive process. Translation is not just about looking up a term in a dictionary and finding an equivalent that fits. Translation requires that we discover what the speaker intended by a word, what his audience likely understood from it, and what emotions and images the word evoked for them. There is often figurative usage, allusions to the Qurʾan or to Prophetic traditions, or to debates current in the day. Sometimes they use rhyme or plays on words that make their statement stay in the mind better. In short, there is much that goes into understanding the source language. Then there are the challenges of conveying all or much of that in the receptor language.

To understand the term ʿaql, we surveyed the existing positions. ʿAllāmah al-Majlisī has collected 6 meanings for the term. Keeping those meanings in mind, and also keeping our eyes open to other possibilities, we conducted our research on all 36 traditions in Book I, and all other aḥādīth that use the term. We tried to decipher what ʿaql meant in each tradition, and since jahl is the counterpart to ʿaql, this gave us insight into the meanings of jahl too. We determined that ʿaql is used in four meanings, and that jahl is used as the opposite of these four meanings. When opposed to ʿaql, jahl never means “ignorance” or “not knowing.” It means “not having an intellect,” “not using one’s intellect,” or “using one’s intellect for evil.”

I will add that I was influenced early on by Eugene Nida’s The Theory and Practice of Translation, particularly what he calls “dynamic equivalence.”[1]In this regard, Nida says, “…the intelligibility of a translation…is not to be measured merely in terms of whether the words are understandable and the sentences grammatically structured, but in terms of the total impact the message has on the one who receives it.” Eugene A Nida. & Charles R. Taber, The Theory and Practice of Translation (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1969), p. 22.

Al-Sidrah: Some say that every translation is also an interpretation. Do you agree with that, or do you think translators should strive to bring out the original author’s voice, not their own?

RA: To my mind, it depends on the project. Probably in most cases, the translator is responsible for assuming the author’s voice. But in the case of Islamic sources—i.e., Qurʾan and hadith—since guidance is the ultimate goal, the translator, particularly the scholar-translator, needs to have an eye to how a text will contribute to the guidance or misguidance of the reader. Because this is ITI’s vantage point, I think some, especially in the academic world, have taken issue with our translation, accusing us of putting too much of our own understanding into the translation. In our defense, it is not our personal, unfounded understanding that we are injecting into the translation. Rather, it is the understanding we have gleaned from the sum total of related texts, informed by the interpretations of the Shiʿi scholarly tradition.

Al-Sidrah: How have you chosen to resolve the tension that arises from a particular text allowing multiple readings or ways of understanding? Do you think it would differ depending on the nature of the text being translated—across disciplines or genres—or depending on the purpose of the translation itself?

RA: As a rule, we have always attempted to examine all available scholarly views on a given tradition. Out of these, we rule out readings we find incongruent with the apparent meaning of the text. Sometimes, we are able to propose new readings. This usually leaves us with two or three plausible readings. If we find one reading compelling, we translate the text to convey that reading, and in the commentary, we offer alternate translations that lead to other readings. If we are undecided, we attempt to translate the text ambiguously, so that it lends itself to all possible readings.

Aḥādīth

Al-Sidrah: In your work, what have you noticed about the language of the Imams? Do the Imams always directly respond to the issue they are asked about?

RA: Not necessarily. They themselves tell us that God has commanded us to ask them, but it is up to them whether or not to answer us and how. Because they are infallible and supremely wise, everything they say is laden with meaning. Even what they do not say is laden with meaning. Sometimes they avoid a subject out of fear. Sometimes they tread lightly so as not to offend or to demonstrate diplomacy. Sometimes they steer the questioner away from his question to something of greater importance. Whatever the case, we always make every effort to understand how the Imam’s answer fits with the question, and to the extent that it doesn’t, why that may be so.

Al-Sidrah: Could you provide an example of a case, say, where the Imams steered the listener away from his original question toward something of greater importance?

RA: For example, in al-Kāfī, 2.19.21, a man asks a follow-up question of Imam al-Ṣādiq. The question is presumably a legitimate question, but it seems the questioner has assumed that the Imam’s response is like the opinion of any other scholar. Instead of answering, the Imam castigates him for this assumption.[2]The hadith is as follows: ʿAlī reported from Muḥammad ibn ʿĪsā from Yunūs that Qutaybah said, “A man asked Abu ʿAbd Allāh [al-Ṣādiq] about an issue, and he answered his question. Then the man said, ‘Tell me [your opinion.] If the circumstances had been such and such, what would you have said about this issue?’ Imam al-Ṣādiq told him: ‘Silence! Any answer I give you is from the Messenger of God. We, [the family of the Messenger,] have nothing to do with ‘Tell me [your opinion]?’’” al-Kāfī, trans. Shaykh Rizwan Arastu, vol. 2 (Dearborn: Islamic Texts Institute, 2014), p. 390.

Al-Sidrah: Your translation doesn’t deal with the provenance of aḥādīth. Why?

RA: The first eight books of al-Kāfī deal with matters other than law. In these areas, scholars have always paid less attention to chains of transmission and have focused mainly on the content of the tradition. The reason they give is that we have the tools to evaluate the content of such traditions using our reason, historical sources, universal ethical principles, and such. That said, al-Majlisī’s Mirʾāt al-ʿUqūl does label each tradition according to the traditional four-tiered system.[3]Mirʾāt al-ʿUqūl, by ʿAllāmah Muḥammad Bāqir al-Majlisī, is a complete commentary of al-Kāfī. A work of erudition, Mirʾāt expounds on the various dimensions of the aḥādīth, including the linguistic, the theological, and the provenantial. The software produced by the Noor Institute also labels each tradition based on the strength and other characteristics of the chain. Their labels are apparently based on Sayyid Mūsā al-Zanjānī’s research.[4]Sayyid Mūsā al-Shubayrī al-Zanjānī (b. 1928) is one of the contemporary marājiʿ of Qumm. His teachers were among the premier ʿulamāʾ of the 20th century, including Ayatullah Sayyid Ḥusayn al-Burūjirdī, al-Sayyid al-Muḥaqqiq Muḥammad al-Dāmād, and Ayatullah Sayyid Abū al-Qāsim al-Khūʾī. Sayyid al-Zanjānī’s expertise in hadith and its provenance is renowned. We decided to prioritize content of the traditions over an evaluation of the chains, partly in keeping with scholarly tradition, and partly in knowledge that those who are interested in specialized aspects of the traditions can easily refer to the above-mentioned sources.

Al-Sidrah: How can we understand certain aḥādīth that seem jarring to us nowadays, that may conflict with our sense of how the world works, either physically, morally, or socially? For example, the Prophet’s hadith, انت ومالك لأبيك (You are simply a possession of your father.) where a person complained that his father dictated his life too much. How can we begin to understand these aḥādīth?

RA: This question strikes at the core of the work of the commentator. He must steep himself in the culture of the time, the debates that were current, the language that was used, the norms that governed. While we are aided in this effort by past scholars, lexicographers, and historians, we must also have the humility to admit that we cannot fully steep ourselves in the past. There are aspects of the past that we may never understand.

That said, the aspects of traditions that are lost to us because of our distance are not critical impediments to understanding Islamic faith and practice. The universality and timelessness of Islamic teachings is in its own place, and the particulars of time and place are in another.

Al-Sidrah: The Imams are said to speak to people according to their levels of intelligence. So, many seemingly simple aḥādīth actually have much greater depth than meets the eye. How can we go about uncovering what the Imams really mean in a hadith?

RA: It is not that a given statement contains endless meaning, and that each person who reads it understands something new. It is that they kept their immediate audience in mind, never overburdening them with more than they could handle. But, as with any area of knowledge, when a sage says something simple, it is a summary of profound knowledge. Compare this to the simple statement of a simpleton which means, perhaps, less than meets the eye.

Al-Sidrah: Can you provide an example of this?

RA: For example, in tradition 3.26.2, Abū Baṣīr asks how it is possible for God to want something to exist but not love it.

[The complete hadith is as follows: 

ʿAlī ibn Ibrāhīm reported from Muḥammad ibn ʿĪsā from Yūnus ibn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān from Abān that Abū Baṣīr said, “I asked Abū ʿAbd Allāh [al-Ṣādiq], ‘[Does God] wish [a thing], [then] will [it], [then] decree [it], [then] decide [it]?’ He replied: ‘Yes.’ I asked, ‘And does he love [for it to be]?’ He replied: ‘No.’ I asked, ‘How [is it that he wishes [a thing], [then] wills [it], [then] decrees [it], [then] decides [it], but he does not love [for it to be]?’ He replied: ‘Thus has [the matter] come down to us.’” (al-Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, 3.26.2)]

We might expect him to explain why there is no contradiction between wanting something to be and not loving it or being pleased with it. Instead, he simply refers to the teachings of his forefathers and says, “Thus has [the matter] come down to us”. Perhaps his message to Abū Baṣīr is that in such matters, it is not necessary to fully understand how it is true; it is sufficient to accept it as true because you have received it from an authoritative and trustworthy source.

Al-Sidrah: How do you account for taqiyyah when reading a hadith?

RA: Some statements in traditions stand as outliers to the corpus of Islamic teachings from the Prophet’s family and reflect, instead, a view held by their detractors. These we consign to taqiyyah, dissimulation, by which the Imams prioritized some greater good over a particular true teaching. In such cases, we collect other traditions that reflect the true teaching and, where possible, cite the opposition viewpoint to make clear how this outlier agrees with the latter and contradicts the former.

Al-Sidrah: The Imams speak to issues relevant to a particular person, but also issues that are universal. How can we distinguish between the two?

RA: The issues relevant to a particular person fit into a larger, universal truth. The trick is to understand the particular in a way that is congruent with the larger picture.

Aḥādīth and the Qurʾan

Al-Sidrah: How do aḥādīth help us understand the Qurʾan better?

RA: The Qurʾan has an apparent meaning that is accessible, to a point, to anyone who reads it with preparation and reflection. That said, the Prophet and his family are the direct addressees of the Qurʾan and the final word in its interpretation. While we can understand something of the Qurʾan without them, we cannot conclusively know its intended meaning and practical implications until we scour the traditions to see what they have said about a verse.

For the most part, the traditions in which the Imams cite the Qurʾan or explain the Qurʾan do not explain the apparent meaning the way an exegete does. Presumably, they expect that we can uncover the apparent meaning through deliberation. Sometimes they show an application or extension of a verse that is not immediately obvious to us. Sometimes they qualify the verse and limit it in a way that we have no authority to do. And sometimes they reveal hidden layers of meaning that are otherwise completely veiled from us.

We cite some examples of their explanation of verses under tradition 2.11.9. There is one example of an apparently general verse regarding praying at the Station of Abraham, which they qualify. There is another example of an ambiguous verse on wudu’, where they steer us away from its apparent meaning.

[The verses, along with the commentary from al-Kafi: Book of Knowledge and Its Merits, vol. 2, are as follows:

For example, note the following verse: ‘Make of the Station of Abraham a place of prayer’ (2:125). Its apparent meaning is that we must pray at the Station of Abraham (the impression left by Prophet Abraham’s feet on a stone that is preserved in a glass structure near the Kaʿbah). Certainly, it would be impossible for us to pray directly on top of Abraham’s footprints, so the verse must be telling us to pray near the Station: in front of it, or behind it, or to one of its sides. Thus, the verse, in and of itself, is general with respect to the location where this prayer must be offered. There are two traditions that qualify the general meaning of this verse. The first is transmitted by Ibrāhīm ibn Abī Maḥmūd in which he said, “I asked al-Riḍā, ‘Should I offer the two-cycle prayer for the ṭawāf of my obligatory ḥajj behind the Station [of Abraham] where it lies presently or where it was in the days of the Messenger of God?” He replied, ‘Where it is presently’” (al-Kāfī 15.137.4). The second is transmitted by Muʿawiyah ibn ʿAmmār who reported that Imam al-Ṣādiq said, “When you complete your ṭawāf, approach the Station of Abraham and offer a two-cycle prayer and put [the Station] in front of you” (al-Kāfī 15.137.1; see Mawsūʿah al-Imām al-Khūʾī vol. 29 p. 101 for the complete discussion). Clearly, if a person was unaware of these traditions and the correct methodology of textual analysis, he would incorrectly surmise that 2:125 is general and that one may legitimately offer one’s prayer anywhere around the Station of Abraham.

…Unequivocal (muḥkam) verses are those whose apparent meaning is intended while equivocal (mutashābih) verses are those whose apparent meaning is not intended even though there is no clue within the immediate vicinity of the text to indicate this. For example, the Verse of Ablution (Qurʾān 5:6), which legislates wuḍūʾ seems apparently to be saying that we must wash our arms to the elbow, meaning from the fingers in the direction of the elbows, and there is nothing in the verse to indicate otherwise. However, from the traditions, we understand that this apparent meaning is not intended and that the verse is only making known the limits of the arm, not the direction of washing, and that we must wash from the elbow down to the fingertips. Clearly, one who does not recognize this verse’s point of equivocation will wash his arm the wrong way and spoil his ablution. (al-Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, trans. Shaykh Rizwan Arastu, vol. 2, p. 185-7)]

Al-Sidrah: Certain aḥādīth seem to interpret the Qurʾan primarily in terms of wilāyah, even verses that may not be as clearly about the Imams. The second part of that same verse of Surat al-Jinn, verse 18, where it states, “Call not, along with God, upon anyone,” is described in some aḥādīth as also including the Imams. How can we begin to understand these aḥādīth and this form of interpreting the Qurʾan?

RA: When dealing with these types of traditions, we need to move away from the mindset of interpretation and realize that the Infallibles are uncovering meaning beyond the words. It is not just that they are smarter, cleverer interpreters. Rather, they are infallible vicegerents of God charged with teaching us what we could not otherwise have known.

Al-Sidrah: How do we make sense of what the Imams say when the hadith diverges so drastically from the apparent meaning, which is the only level accessible to us independently? In other words, when the Imam’s meaning diverges, does that almost negate or conflict with the apparent meaning?

RA: We addressed this issue in a footnote on tradition 2.11.9.

[The footnote states:

You might also think that if such equivocal verses exist in the Qurʾān then we cannot rely upon the apparent meaning of the Qurʾān with any certainty because we will always entertain the possibility that the apparent meaning is qualified by some other verse or tradition. Such a conclusion stems from a misunderstanding of what it means to rely on the apparent meaning of the Qurʾān. To rely on it without scouring the sources in search of all qualifiers is foolhardy. However, once we have scoured the sources and determined conclusively that there are no qualifiers for a verse, then we may reasonably rely on its apparent meaning. In the following passage, Imam al-Ṣādiq has described those who interpret the Qurʾān without scouring the sources: “They have slapped together parts of the Qurʾān with others. They argue using a verse that has been qualified while they presume it to be unqualified. They argue using a verse that is specific while they presume it to be general. They argue using the beginning of a verse and abandon the traditions that explain its correct meaning. They do not consider how a verse begins and how it ends, and they do not know its ins and outs. All this because they have not taken their knowledge from its possessors. Thus, they are misguided and they misguide others” (Wasāʾil al-shīʿah 27.1.13.33593).]

 

Conclusions

Al-Sidrah: What are some strategies that non-specialists can use when reading aḥādīth to try to understand what the Imam may have really meant?

RA: They must not be afraid to read traditions and draw preliminary conclusions, but they must not be over-eager to make conclusive claims about what they mean. Our scholars are circumspect when it comes to drawing conclusions, so non-scholars must be ever more so.

The best way to learn is with the guidance of scholars, not by independent study. They should approach well-attested scholars and ask them to teach them or at least to address their questions. A substitute for a live scholar is a book like ITI’s works.

Al-Sidrah: What are some main issues that non-specialists should be aware of when reading aḥādīth? For example, when dealing with seemingly contradictory aḥādīth?

RA: Sometimes people fail to differentiate between the words of an infallible and the tradition, which is an archive of those words. An infallible always speaks infallibly (even when he is under taqiyyah), but a tradition is not infallible. It is possible for a hadith to be fabricated or distorted, and this does not mean that the Imam is not infallible. Taqiyyah is also a reality and it gives rise to contradictions. People should be aware of these ideas in general so that when they see a contradiction, their faith is not shaken; rather, they make note and ask a scholar to help resolve the discrepancy.

Al-Sidrah: What are some benefits the English-speaking community may attain from translations of primary hadith sources like al-Kāfī?

RA: My vision for ITI was to reproduce for people the experience I had when I began studying traditions with my teachers. The Imams, who had been two-dimensional in my mind, came into three-dimensions and color as I studied their traditions. Each tradition is a snippet of an interaction with the Prophet or Imam. It gives us a chance to see them in real life, interacting with the world around them. But reading traditions is not without its perils. I needed a teacher whom I could ask, before whom I could air my frustrations, who could address my concerns and channel my efforts into a productive learning experience. In writing our commentary, we have tried to anticipate the questions our readers are likely to have, to help them come away from a tradition with a heightened understanding of the teaching contextualized in the larger picture of Islamic teachings.

Notes   [ + ]

1. In this regard, Nida says, “…the intelligibility of a translation…is not to be measured merely in terms of whether the words are understandable and the sentences grammatically structured, but in terms of the total impact the message has on the one who receives it.” Eugene A Nida. & Charles R. Taber, The Theory and Practice of Translation (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1969), p. 22.
2. The hadith is as follows: ʿAlī reported from Muḥammad ibn ʿĪsā from Yunūs that Qutaybah said, “A man asked Abu ʿAbd Allāh [al-Ṣādiq] about an issue, and he answered his question. Then the man said, ‘Tell me [your opinion.] If the circumstances had been such and such, what would you have said about this issue?’ Imam al-Ṣādiq told him: ‘Silence! Any answer I give you is from the Messenger of God. We, [the family of the Messenger,] have nothing to do with ‘Tell me [your opinion]?’’” al-Kāfī, trans. Shaykh Rizwan Arastu, vol. 2 (Dearborn: Islamic Texts Institute, 2014), p. 390.
3. Mirʾāt al-ʿUqūl, by ʿAllāmah Muḥammad Bāqir al-Majlisī, is a complete commentary of al-Kāfī. A work of erudition, Mirʾāt expounds on the various dimensions of the aḥādīth, including the linguistic, the theological, and the provenantial.
4. Sayyid Mūsā al-Shubayrī al-Zanjānī (b. 1928) is one of the contemporary marājiʿ of Qumm. His teachers were among the premier ʿulamāʾ of the 20th century, including Ayatullah Sayyid Ḥusayn al-Burūjirdī, al-Sayyid al-Muḥaqqiq Muḥammad al-Dāmād, and Ayatullah Sayyid Abū al-Qāsim al-Khūʾī. Sayyid al-Zanjānī’s expertise in hadith and its provenance is renowned.

None Know except the Knowing: Ahl al-Bayt & their Knowledge of the Qurʾan

Tafsīr al-Ṣāfī is an exegetical work of the Qurʾan by Muḥammad Muhsin al-Fayḍ al-Kāshānī (d. 1090/1679). Al-Fayḍ al-Kāshānī was a prolific Imami Shiʿi scholar who wrote about many of the various Islamic sciences, contributing in profound and lasting ways to the fields of Islamic mysticism, aḥādīth, and exegesis. He was a student and son-in-law of Mullā Ṣadrā al-Shīrāzī, the renowned Shiʿi mystic-philosopher of the Safavid period.

In the introduction to his tafsīr, al-Kāshānī outlines in twelve parts his view on major issues relevant to the Qurʾan and the Qurʾanic sciences. He presents his views primarily through culling a set of aḥādīth, along with his commentary on those aḥādīth. Below is a translation of the second part of this introduction, where the author presents a number of aḥādīth that demonstrate the Imams of the Ahl al-Bayt are the exclusive possessors of the totality of Qurʾanic knowledge. The Qurʾan says that there are “manifest signs in the breasts of those who have been given knowledge,”[1]Qurʾan, Ṭāhā (20):49. and orders people to, “ask the People of Remembrance, if you do not know.”[2]Qurʾan, al-Naḥl (16):43. Only the Ahl al-Bayt, the author argues, have access to every level of Qurʾanic meaning. While the Qurʾan is approachable at a basic level for all readers, those who wish to gain insights beyond the apparent meanings of the sacred text must seek out the knowledge proffered by the Imams, a requirement that is rooted in the Qurʾan itself. The final narrations quoted by al-Kāshānī showcase the error of those who took recourse to their own personal opinion when interpreting the Qurʾan’s apparent meaning, or attempting to go beyond it. The implication is therefore salvific: reliance on the authority of the Imams for seeking greater depth in Qurʾanic knowledge is an indispensable part of exegesis that mitigates the harms of conjecture or personal opinion.  


On True and Complete Qurʾanic Knowledge Being the Domain of Ahl al-Bayt

Muḥammad ibn Yaʿqūb al-Kulaynī reports in al-Kāfī, through his chain of narrators that ends with Sulaym ibn Qays al-Hilālī, that the latter heard the Commander of the Faithful, Imam ʿAlī (ʿa), say:

“… Not a verse (of the Qurʾan) was revealed to the Messenger of Allah (ṣ) except that he recited and dictated it to me. I would then write it down by my own hand. He taught me its taʾwīl and tafsīr,[3]Taʾwīl is a technical term that is translated here as the esoteric interpretation of the Qurʾanic text. It refers primarily to meanings of Qurʾanic statements that are beyond, yet in consonance with, the surface-level meaning of the text. Such meanings are accessible to only a chosen few who are endowed by Allah with such knowledge. The contrasting technical term tafsīr is translated here as the exoteric or apparent meaning of the words of the Qurʾan, which is accessible at varying degrees to normal people. its nāsikh and mansūkh,[4]These two technical terms refer to the idea that some commandments mentioned in the Qurʾanic text were later abrogated. The nāsikh refers to a new commandment which abrogates the mansūkh, an outdated commandment. The nature of this abrogation is understood differently by various schools of Qurʾanic interpretation and Islamic law. The Imami Shiʿi school formulated an understanding of abrogation that recognized the eternal knowledge and wisdom of God, without any implication of God “changing His mind.” They argue that it is not God who has changed, but rather a new set of circumstances has appeared in the world warranting the appropriateness of different laws. The so-called “new” laws would not be new per-se, nor would “old” laws be outdated. Rather, all such laws are legislated by God in a way that makes them limited to the contexts defined by the laws themselves. its muḥkam and mutashābih.[5]The technical terms mentioned here refer to an interpretive process where “clearer” statements (muḥkam) of the Qurʾanic text are to be used to clarify other, more ambiguous or enigmatic statements (mutashābih). Muḥkam is sometimes translated as decisive and mutashābih as ambiguous, although some scholars argue that such translations are oversimplifications since every statement of the text has degrees of clarity. He prayed to Allah that He teach me the understanding of the Qurʾan and its preservation. Thereafter, I did not forget a single verse he dictated to me, or any other knowledge he transmitted to me. And ever since that prayer of the Prophet, I wrote all that he dictated. [The Prophet] taught me all that God taught him, and he did not omit any of it, whether of the lawful or the unlawful, of Allah’s commandments or prohibitions—from the past or the future—or of the testaments revealed to anyone before him regarding worship or sin; and I memorized all of it. In order that I not forget a single letter of the Book, he placed his hand upon my chest and prayed to Allah that He fill my heart with knowledge, understanding, wisdom, and light. I said to him, ‘O Messenger of Allah, may my father and mother be ransomed for your sake.  Ever since you called upon Allah for my sake, I have not forgotten anything, nor lost anything I did not write. Do you fear I may forget in the future?’ The Prophet replied to me, ‘I do not fear forgetfulness or ignorance on your part.’”[6] The reader should note that this is an excerpt from a larger hadith. For the full hadith, see al-Kāfī, vol. 1 (Qumm: Dār al-Kutub al-Islāmiyyah, 1407 A.H.), hadith #1, p. 64.

Al-ʿAyyāshī also narrates this hadith in his tafsīr.[7]Muḥammad ibn Masʿūd al-ʿAyyāshī, Tafsīr al-Ayyāshī, vol. 1 (Tehran: Maktabat al-ʿIlmiyyah al-Islāmiyyah, 1380 A.H.), p. 253.

Al-Shaykh al-Ṣadūq,[8]This is the epithet given to Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī ibn Bābawayh al-Qummī, an early and pivotal Shiʿi scholar whose work Man lā Yaḥduruh al-Faqīh is canonical within the Shiʿi hadith corpus. in his book Ikmāl al-Dīn, narrates the above hadith with minor variations. His narration ends with the following:

“The Prophet (ṣ) then said, ‘My Lord has answered my prayer regarding you, ʿAlī, and regarding your associates who will be after you.’ I asked, ‘O Messenger of Allah, who are my associates who will come after me?’ The Prophet said, ‘Those who Allah has joined to Himself and to me.’ He then recited the verse, ‘Obey Allah. And obey the Messenger and the Possessors of Authority among you.’[9]Qurʾan, al-Nisāʾ (4): 59. I asked, ‘Who are these people (who possess authority)?’ The Prophet replied, ‘My awṣiyāʾ,[10]The Arabic word waṣī (pl. awṣiyāʾ) refers linguistically to one who is authorized to execute a command on behalf of another. In its technical meaning, the Imam appears to be referring to those commissioned by the Prophet on behalf of Allah to interpret and teach the authoritative meanings of the Qurʾan, that is, the Imams of Ahl al-Bayt. It will hereafter be translated as executor. who will meet me at the Heavenly Cistern.[11]This is a translation of the word kawthar, a term used in the Qurʾan. It refers to a cistern in paradise. All are guided, and all are guides. None who forsakes them does them harm. They are with the Qurʾan, and the Qurʾan with them; neither does it separate from them, nor do they separate from it. My ummah is given succor through them. Calamity is averted from my ummah through them. It receives rain and its prayers are answered because of them.’ I then asked, ‘O Messenger of Allah, name them for me.’ The Prophet then placed his hand upon the head of Ḥasan (ʿa) and said ‘This son of mine.’ He then placed his hand upon the head of Ḥusayn (ʿa) and said, ‘Then, this son of mine. And his son after him, called ʿAlī. He will be born in your lifetime, so send him my greetings. Then the remaining twelve from the progeny of Muḥammad.’ I said, ‘May my father and mother be ransomed for your sake. Name them for me.’ The Prophet then named them, one after another. By Allah, O brother of the Hilāl tribe,[12]Here, Imam ʿAli is referring to Sulaym ibn Qays al-Hilālī, the narrator of this hadith. the Prophet named among them the Mahdī, the Guided one of the ummah of Muḥammad, who will fill the land with justice and fairness, just as it was filled with injustice and oppression. By Allah, I know who will pledge allegiance to him, between the rukn and maqām.[13]The terms rukn and maqām refer to two important markers in Masjid al-Harām, the former being the southern corner of the Kaʿbah, and the latter being the “Station of Ibrahim,” which is opposite the rukn. In other words, the Imam will be standing in front of the Kaʿbah. And I know the names of their forefathers and their tribes.’”[14]Al-Shaykh al-Ṣadūq, Kamāl al-Dīn wa-Tamām al-Niʿmah, vol. 1 (Tehran: al-Islāmiyyah, 1395 A.H.), hadith #37, p. 284-5.

In al-Kāfī, al-Kulaynī narrates through his chain of transmission from Abū Jaʿfar (Imam al-Bāqir, ʿa), who stated:

“Only a liar will claim to have collected the entire Qurʾan as it was revealed [other than the Ahl al-Bayt.]  None have compiled, memorized, and preserved [the Qurʾan] exactly as Allah revealed except for ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib and the Imams after him.”[15]Al-Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, vol. 1, hadith #1, p. 228.

Al-Kulaynī narrates another hadith with his chain of transmitters from Imam al-Bāqir (ʿa), stating, “No one can claim that he has the entirety of the Qurʾan—with its outer and its inner aspects—except the Executors (of the Prophet’s trust, that is, the awṣiyāʾ).”[16]Al-Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, vol. 1, hadith #2, p. 228.

“No one can claim that he has the entirety of the Qurʾan—with its outer and its inner aspects—except the Executors (of the Prophet’s trust, that is, the awṣiyāʾ).”

Al-Kulaynī narrates yet another hadith with a particular chain from Imam al-Ṣādiq (ʿa), who comments on the following verse: “Such are clear signs in the breasts of those who possess knowledge…,”[17]Qurʾan, al-ʿAnkabūt (29):49. stating, “They are the Imams.”[18]Al-Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, vol. 1, hadith #2, p. 214.

He also narrates the following from Imam al-Ṣādiq, who says: “The Prophet of Allah is my forefather, and I have the knowledge of the Book of Allah. It contains the origin of creation and all that will exist until the Day of Judgment. It contains news of the heavens and the earth, news of Paradise and Hellfire, of what was and what will be. I know this as clearly as I see the palm of my own hand. Certainly, Allah has said ‘Within it is an explanation of all things.’[19]Qurʾan, al-Naḥl (16):89.[20]Al-Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, vol. 1, hadith #8, p. 61.

I [al-Kāshānī] can say the following about this hadith: The birth referred to here could entail both bodily and spiritual birth. After all, the [Imam’s] knowledge refers back to [the Prophet], just as his lineage traces back to him. The Imam inherits the Prophet’s knowledge, just as he inherits his wealth. Hence, the Imam can state, “I know the the Book of Allah. It contains such and such,” by which he means, “I know the Qurʾan in its entirety.”

Al-Kulaynī cites the following hadith from Imam al-Ṣādiq (ʿa): “The book of Allah contains news and tidings of what was before you and of what will come, and it details what is now among you. And we [Ahl al-Bayt] know this, and we understand it.”[21]Al-Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, vol. 1, hadith #9, p. 61. Imam al-Ṣādiq (ʿa) also said, “We are those firmly rooted in knowledge. We are those who know the deeper meanings [of the Qurʾan].[22]A reference to Qurʾan, Āl ʿImrān (3):8.[23]Al-Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, vol. 1, hadith #1, p. 213.

Tafsīr al-Ayyāshi narrates the following hadith from Imam al-Ṣādiq (ʿa): “We are the Ahl al-Bayt. Allah will never stop sending from among us those who know His Book from its beginning to its very end. We know what Allah deems lawful, and what is forbidden. That which we must conceal, we do not disclose to anyone.”[24]Al-ʿAyyāshī, Tafsīr al-Ayyāshī, vol. 1, p. 16.

Another hadith states: “Among the knowledge given to us is the explanation of the Qurʾan, its decrees, and its wisdom. If we could find worthy vessels and a reprieve [from persecution] (wiʿāʾ aw mustarāḥ), then we would disclose it. And we [always] seek the help of Allah.”[25]Muḥammad ibn Ḥasan al-Ṣaffār, Basāʾir al-Darajāt fī Faḍāʾil Āl Muḥammad, vol. 1 (Qumm: Maktabat Āyatullah al-Marʿashī al-Najafī, 1404 A.H.), hadith #1, p. 214.

Among the knowledge given to us is the explanation of the Qurʾan, its decrees, and its wisdom. If we could find worthy vessels and a reprieve [from persecution], then we would disclose it.

The following is narrated from Imam al-Ṣādiq (ʿa): “Allah made the Ahl al-Bayt’s wilāyah[26]Wilāyah is a term which linguistically refers to a relationship of adoration, closeness, and obedience that may exist between people. In its technical meaning, it refers to the devotion and obedience due to the Prophet and his select family. the axis of the Qurʾan and all (other sacred) texts, such that the apparent meanings (muḥkam) of the Qurʾan revolve around it. Such texts are elevated by it, and true belief is clarified through it. The Messenger of Allah commanded that the Qurʾan and the Family of Muḥammad be emulated. Thus, he [the Prophet] proclaimed in his final sermon: ‘I leave among you two weighty things: one is greater, and the other less so. As for the greater, it is the Book of my Lord. As for the other, it is my family, the Ahl al-Bayt. Keep my memory [alive] in both. So long as you hold fast to them, never will you go astray.’”[27]Al-ʿAyyāshī, Tafsīr al-ʿAyyāshī, vol. 1, p. 5.

In al-Kāfī, al-Kulaynī narrates a hadith from Imam al-Bāqir (ʿa) through his chain that ends with Zayd al-Shahhām. An individual named Qatāda bin Diʿāma had come to the Imam. The Imam said, “O Qatāda, are you the jurist of the people of Baṣrah?” Qatāda said, “They presume so.” The Imam said, “I have heard that you explain the Qurʾan?” Qatāda respond, “Yes.” So the Imam said, “Do you explain it through knowledge or through ignorance?” Qatāda said, “No, rather through knowledge.” The Imam continued, “Since you explain the Qurʾan through knowledge, and if you really are who you claim you are, may I pose a question to you?” Qatāda said, “Ask.” The Imam said, “Tell me about what Allah states in Sūrat Sabaʾ: ‘And We set, between them and the cities that We have blessed, cities apparent, and well We measured the journey between them: ‘Journey among them by night and day in security!’’”[28]Qurʾan, Sabaʾ (34):18. Qatāda said, “This verse suggests that whoever leaves from his house with provisions, a camel, and licit funds by which he intends to reach The House of Allah, he will be safe until he returns to his home.” The Imam responded, “I ask you, O Qatāda: Do you realize that a person may leave his house with provisions, a camel, and licit funds by which he intends to reach the House of Allah, but he is privateered on the way, his funds stolen, and is struck with such a calamity that he is (utterly) destroyed?” Qatāda said, “By Allah, yes I am aware.” The Imam said, “Woe upon you, O Qatāda! If you explain the Qurʾan of your own accord, you will lead yourself and others to destruction. And if you attempt to explain it through the opinions of other men, you will perish, and will cause others to perish as well. Woe upon you, O Qatāda! This verse says that whoever leaves his home with provisions, a camel, and licit funds, seeking this House (of Allah), [but also] knowing our right, his heart will incline towards us, just as Allah has declared: ‘Our Lord, let them perform the prayer, and make the hearts of people yearn towards them.’[29]Qurʾan, Ibrāhīm (14):37. In this verse, Prophet Ibrahīm (ṣ) did not intend the House, otherwise he would have said, “…and make the hearts of people yearn towards it.”[30]Imam al-Bāqir is stating that prayer of Prophet Ibrahīm is not a plea to make people’s hearts incline towards the Kaʿbah, but rather the apparent meaning is to make their hearts incline to his descendants, which would include the family of the Prophet Mohammad as well. In other words, the verse is not referring to the house. Therefore he said, their hearts “yearn for them,” and not “yearn for it.” Thus, what is meant are a people—namely, Ahl al-Bayt—and not a particular place nor a particular building. No, rather, it is we, by Allah, who are the plea and prayer of Ibrahim. Whoever has a heart that inclines towards us, his hajj is accepted; whoever does not, his hajj is not accepted. O Qatāda, when a person realizes this attribute within himself, then we will secure and protect him from the punishment of Hellfire on the Day of Judgement. Qatāda then said, “By Allah, I will not interpret the Qurʾan except in this way!” The Imam said, “Woe upon you! O Qatāda, only he who is addressed by the Qurʾan truly knows it.”[31]Al-Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, vol. 8, hadith #485, p. 311.

This is how this hadith is found in the various recensions of al-Kāfī. However it seems some of the text may be missing, since there is no real connection between the statement of Qatāda and the verse. This verse actually demands an entirely different question, namely, “Which land is this verse referring to?” Qatāda’s response is more appropriate for the verse: “And whosoever enters it is in security.”[32]Qurʾan, Āl ʿImrān (3):97. This is also true of what the Imam states.

Another indicator of an omission here is a hadith of Imam al-Ṣādiq (ʿa) found in ʿIlal al-Sharāʾiʿ. In this hadith, the Imam is narrated as having discussed these two verses, beginning by asking Abū Ḥanīfah, “Are you the jurist of the people of Iraq?” Abū Ḥanīfah responded, “Yes.” The Imam then asked, “On what basis do you give legal rulings?” Abū Ḥanīfah said, “The Book of Allah and the sunnah of His Prophet.” The Imam then asked, “Abū Ḥanīfah, do you know the Book of Allah as it was meant to be known? Do you know the difference between the verse that abrogates and the verse that is abrogated?”[33]Another reference to the technical terms, nāsikh and mansūkh. Abū Ḥanīfah said, “Yes.”  The Imam then responded, “Abū Ḥanīfah, you claim to have knowledge. Woe upon you! Allah did not give this knowledge [even] to the people of the sacred books to which he revealed. Woe upon you! Such knowledge is not given except to a select from among the descendants of our Prophet. I do not see you as even knowing a single word of the Book. If you are as you say you are, which you are not, then tell me: ‘Travel within it, for nights and days, in safety…’[34]Qurʾan, Sabaʾ (34):18. Where is this place?” Abū Ḥanīfah said, “I take it to be between Makkah and Madinah.” The Imam turned to his companions and said, “You all know that people are sometimes robbed on the road between Makkah and Madinah such that their wealth is taken, and their lives in danger. They may [even] be killed.” They responded, “Yes, indeed.” Abū Ḥanifāh fell silent. The Imam said, “O Abū Ḥanīfah, tell me about the verse: ‘Whoever enters it will be safe.[35]Qurʾan, Āl ʿImrān (3):97. Where is this place?” Abū Ḥanīfah said, “The Kaʿbah.” The Imam responded, “Do you know that Ḥajjāj bin Yūsuf used ballistas against Ibn Zubayr, who was in the Kaʿbah, and killed him. Was he safe therein?” Abū Ḥanīfah remained silent.”[36]Al-Shaykh al-Ṣadūq, ʿIlal al-Sharāʾiʿ, vol. 1 (Qumm: Maktabat al-Dāwarī, 1427 A.H.), p. 89-91. The proper meaning of these verses will come in their respective locations later in the tafsīr, God-willing.

This excerpt was translated by Azhar Sheraze of the Ahl al-Bayt Islamic Seminary. 

Notes   [ + ]

1. Qurʾan, Ṭāhā (20):49.
2. Qurʾan, al-Naḥl (16):43.
3. Taʾwīl is a technical term that is translated here as the esoteric interpretation of the Qurʾanic text. It refers primarily to meanings of Qurʾanic statements that are beyond, yet in consonance with, the surface-level meaning of the text. Such meanings are accessible to only a chosen few who are endowed by Allah with such knowledge. The contrasting technical term tafsīr is translated here as the exoteric or apparent meaning of the words of the Qurʾan, which is accessible at varying degrees to normal people.
4. These two technical terms refer to the idea that some commandments mentioned in the Qurʾanic text were later abrogated. The nāsikh refers to a new commandment which abrogates the mansūkh, an outdated commandment. The nature of this abrogation is understood differently by various schools of Qurʾanic interpretation and Islamic law. The Imami Shiʿi school formulated an understanding of abrogation that recognized the eternal knowledge and wisdom of God, without any implication of God “changing His mind.” They argue that it is not God who has changed, but rather a new set of circumstances has appeared in the world warranting the appropriateness of different laws. The so-called “new” laws would not be new per-se, nor would “old” laws be outdated. Rather, all such laws are legislated by God in a way that makes them limited to the contexts defined by the laws themselves.
5. The technical terms mentioned here refer to an interpretive process where “clearer” statements (muḥkam) of the Qurʾanic text are to be used to clarify other, more ambiguous or enigmatic statements (mutashābih). Muḥkam is sometimes translated as decisive and mutashābih as ambiguous, although some scholars argue that such translations are oversimplifications since every statement of the text has degrees of clarity.
6. The reader should note that this is an excerpt from a larger hadith. For the full hadith, see al-Kāfī, vol. 1 (Qumm: Dār al-Kutub al-Islāmiyyah, 1407 A.H.), hadith #1, p. 64.
7. Muḥammad ibn Masʿūd al-ʿAyyāshī, Tafsīr al-Ayyāshī, vol. 1 (Tehran: Maktabat al-ʿIlmiyyah al-Islāmiyyah, 1380 A.H.), p. 253.
8. This is the epithet given to Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī ibn Bābawayh al-Qummī, an early and pivotal Shiʿi scholar whose work Man lā Yaḥduruh al-Faqīh is canonical within the Shiʿi hadith corpus.
9. Qurʾan, al-Nisāʾ (4): 59.
10. The Arabic word waṣī (pl. awṣiyāʾ) refers linguistically to one who is authorized to execute a command on behalf of another. In its technical meaning, the Imam appears to be referring to those commissioned by the Prophet on behalf of Allah to interpret and teach the authoritative meanings of the Qurʾan, that is, the Imams of Ahl al-Bayt. It will hereafter be translated as executor.
11. This is a translation of the word kawthar, a term used in the Qurʾan. It refers to a cistern in paradise.
12. Here, Imam ʿAli is referring to Sulaym ibn Qays al-Hilālī, the narrator of this hadith.
13. The terms rukn and maqām refer to two important markers in Masjid al-Harām, the former being the southern corner of the Kaʿbah, and the latter being the “Station of Ibrahim,” which is opposite the rukn. In other words, the Imam will be standing in front of the Kaʿbah.
14. Al-Shaykh al-Ṣadūq, Kamāl al-Dīn wa-Tamām al-Niʿmah, vol. 1 (Tehran: al-Islāmiyyah, 1395 A.H.), hadith #37, p. 284-5.
15. Al-Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, vol. 1, hadith #1, p. 228.
16. Al-Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, vol. 1, hadith #2, p. 228.
17. Qurʾan, al-ʿAnkabūt (29):49.
18. Al-Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, vol. 1, hadith #2, p. 214.
19. Qurʾan, al-Naḥl (16):89.
20. Al-Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, vol. 1, hadith #8, p. 61.
21. Al-Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, vol. 1, hadith #9, p. 61.
22. A reference to Qurʾan, Āl ʿImrān (3):8.
23. Al-Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, vol. 1, hadith #1, p. 213.
24. Al-ʿAyyāshī, Tafsīr al-Ayyāshī, vol. 1, p. 16.
25. Muḥammad ibn Ḥasan al-Ṣaffār, Basāʾir al-Darajāt fī Faḍāʾil Āl Muḥammad, vol. 1 (Qumm: Maktabat Āyatullah al-Marʿashī al-Najafī, 1404 A.H.), hadith #1, p. 214.
26. Wilāyah is a term which linguistically refers to a relationship of adoration, closeness, and obedience that may exist between people. In its technical meaning, it refers to the devotion and obedience due to the Prophet and his select family.
27. Al-ʿAyyāshī, Tafsīr al-ʿAyyāshī, vol. 1, p. 5.
28, 34. Qurʾan, Sabaʾ (34):18.
29. Qurʾan, Ibrāhīm (14):37.
30. Imam al-Bāqir is stating that prayer of Prophet Ibrahīm is not a plea to make people’s hearts incline towards the Kaʿbah, but rather the apparent meaning is to make their hearts incline to his descendants, which would include the family of the Prophet Mohammad as well. In other words, the verse is not referring to the house. Therefore he said, their hearts “yearn for them,” and not “yearn for it.” Thus, what is meant are a people—namely, Ahl al-Bayt—and not a particular place nor a particular building.
31. Al-Kulaynī, al-Kāfī, vol. 8, hadith #485, p. 311.
32, 35. Qurʾan, Āl ʿImrān (3):97.
33. Another reference to the technical terms, nāsikh and mansūkh.
36. Al-Shaykh al-Ṣadūq, ʿIlal al-Sharāʾiʿ, vol. 1 (Qumm: Maktabat al-Dāwarī, 1427 A.H.), p. 89-91.